Let’s put it this way, too: we will lose N1 and Nova (if we haven’t already), and we will get elections. Or: as long as we have (free) N1 and Nova, we won’t have elections.
But rather than pretend to be clever or play the prophet, let the reader think about it for themselves: if elections really are held at the end of October, which is practically less than two months away, how likely is it that either side will accept the voting results?
Let us start with the candidates representing Serbia’s citizens in revolt. There is no reason whatsoever for them to trust the results and accept them unless they participate in the electoral process from beginning to end, meaning at every level of the process and throughout its entire duration.
We have said this countless times, and we will say it again: elections are stolen before election day, on election day, and after election day. So far, we have dealt only with election day itself. As the recent local elections have shown, there is now less theft on election day because people are prepared to confront the regime’s election thieves. But we are nowhere near preventing fraud before and after election day. That is because, before and after election day, elections are stolen inside institutions: the police, municipal authorities, and the courts.
Serbia’s citizens in revolt have no access to these institutions, nor will they gain such access in the next two months. So there is no reason for them to trust the results and accept them. And to be clear, when I say the police, municipal authorities, and the courts, these are not the only places where elections are stolen. Voters will be pressured into voting for the regime wherever possible: in public institutions and state-owned companies, as well as in private businesses. That, too, is electoral theft. But if the police, municipal authorities, and courts functioned as they should, that kind of theft would not be possible.
The calculation is simple: if Serbia’s citizens in revolt want to win the elections, there must be more of them than there are obedient, coerced, and imported voters supporting the government. I believe there are more of them, just as I believe the results will not show it, because of electoral fraud. And then the society in revolt will refuse to accept the election results.
That is what we have on one side. What about the other? Is losing the elections an option for the regime? Of course not. If we really do have elections at the end of October, that will be long before construction work for EXPO is completed and before EXPO itself takes place. It is clear that if the regime loses, we are unlikely to have EXPO. And it is equally clear that the regime cannot give up on EXPO: it is up to its neck in that project (which is probably criminal, and definitely bad). So it has to win the elections, which means it has to steal them.
I am sure that when some people in Serbia heard that the elections would be held at the end of October, they thought: if Vučić is finally calling elections for October, he must have everything rigged so that he can win/steal them. But everything he had been rigging in previous elections could have been rigged for this one much earlier as well, instead of putting us through this ordeal for two years. What was he still missing that he did not have before, but now finally has, allowing him to call the elections? I would say he did not have N1 and Nova under his control, whereas now he does, or soon will.
And this, in fact, is not an article about elections (although it is about them too), but specifically about N1 and Nova. Why is it important for Vučić to have them under his control before he can call elections? Let me say straight away that I do not think he needs them for the campaign, that is, for propaganda. Nor do I think his goal is to restrict the space available to the society in revolt for campaigning: that will merely be a collateral consequence that works in his favour. But let me add this as well: the society in revolt does not need N1 and Nova for campaigning.
Over the past two years, the students have convincingly demonstrated how a successful campaign can be conducted effectively outside the traditional media. Unlike the opposition, which knows this too, having experienced it in 2000, the students have had both the people and the time for what is known as a grassroots campaign, a field campaign, or, to use the term that has become somewhat worn out through repetition, a door-to-door campaign. So even without a single (free) media outlet, Serbia’s citizens in revolt can run a successful campaign.
But why, then, is it important for Vučić to have N1 and Nova under his control, and equally important for us to have them free? Let us return to the beginning of this article. If both sides in the elections are prepared to accept only a result that means victory for them, let us see what happens when, on the evening of the election day, the regime declares victory, which it will. It most certainly will not announce results that would force it to accept defeat.
Suppose that the election headquarters of Serbia’s citizens in revolt (and there will be several of them; let us just hope not too many) have polling station records showing, if not an outright victory for the student and opposition lists, then at least an extremely close result. In other words, only a narrow defeat. Meanwhile, the regime announces results guaranteeing it a convincing victory. As far as the regime is concerned, everything is clear in such a situation: it declares victory, prepares the police, prisons, and courts, and waits for the other side’s reaction.
What can the other side’s reaction be? Or, before that, what conditions have to be met for there to be any reaction at all?
First, turnout figures need to be reported regularly throughout election day. Second, that evening, the students’ and opposition election headquarters need to immediately publish results based on the official records from polling stations. Third, they need to clearly identify where the will of the electorate was subverted, in other words, where the fraud occurred. Fourth, they need to immediately present a plan for responding to that fraud and forcing the regime to publish the correct results.
Finally, fifth, they need to call on Serbia’s citizens in revolt to take joint action. But before points 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 can happen, there has to be a place where all this information can be communicated – a place we can be sure Serbia’s citizens in revolt will turn to for all important information. As things currently stand, that place can only be N1 and Nova; those two television channels have been the only such places, at least until now. (I will say it again: we had this uprising thanks to those two television channels. I will not explain it again; anyone who does not understand that already will not understand it now either.)
If we do not have N1 and Nova, who will cover election day objectively and freely? Who will sit in the studio that evening, comment on the results, and explain how and where the election was stolen? Who will give representatives of Serbia’s citizens in revolt the space to present results based on polling station records? Where will we hear the plan for responding to electoral fraud? And finally, where will Serbia’s citizens in revolt hear the call to come together and defend their electoral will?
Without N1 and Nova, on election day we will be blind and deaf, and incapable of any coordinated action. Everything else is less important, if not entirely irrelevant.
That is why we can only have elections once we no longer have free media – that is, N1 and Nova. And that is precisely what is disappearing before our eyes, just as the announcement of elections arrives.
Translated by Marijana Simić
Peščanik.net, 28.08.2026.
- Biografija
- Latest Posts
Latest posts by Dejan Ilić (see all)
- We’ve lost N1 and Nova, but we have elections - 28/08/2026
- Great balls of fire - 28/08/2026
- Nemamo N1 i Novu: imamo izbore - 25/08/2026
