Photo: Predrag Trokicic
Photo: Predrag Trokicic

No need for interpretation. The President of Russia explained to the Secretary General of the United Nations why he believes that the Russian military intervention in Ukraine is in accordance with international law. Which the latter disputed, practically under his breath. The explanation is instructive.

So, what makes this aggression an intervention, according to Putin? Let’s use a modified version of the example which was brought before the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo. Let’s say that a group of citizens of Chechnya or some other Russian region has made a declaration of independence from Russia and held a referendum, just like Kosovo did in 1991, and asked other countries to acknowledge this. After this, let’s say that they’ve asked some bigger country for military support to defend themselves from Russia, which, according to its constitution, will use force to stop secession of one of its regions, just like it did in the case of Chechnya. Could the secessionists and their foreign allies invoke the decision of the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo?

They could, to the extent that the Court has ruled that the declaration of independence alone does not violate international law, even though, naturally, it does violate domestic law, unless domestic law recognizes the right to secession. Recognition of independence is also the right of every country. But the use of force to make a certain territory of one country independent is not.

Since we have all these examples from our own history, we can point out that the Kosovo referendum from 1991, which is obviously unknown to Putin, did not lead to international recognition or foreign intervention, but it did lead to additional use of force by Serbian authorities to prevent independence. Both the Kosovo referendum and the declaration of independence in 1991 did not violate international law, but neither did the Serbian authorities when they defended their own territory. However, if other countries joined the military conflict, they would have been in violation of international law.

Now, Putin says that, in fact, the Ukrainian regions that declared independence and were recognized by Russia did not have to seek the consent of the Ukrainian authorities to declare independence, and that, a few years later, Russia recognized them and immediately attacked Ukraine, allegedly in order to defend the independent Ukrainian provinces from the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities to regain control of their own territory in accordance with their constitution, which does not allow secession.

And that the latter follows the former, that is, if the declaration of independence does not violate international law, neither does Russian military intervention, to, first, enable that proclamation and then forcibly reject Ukraine’s efforts to regain its own territory.

This is interesting in that Putin himself, in his essay on Russia and Ukraine from last year, blamed Lenin for Ukraine’s independence, because the constitution of the Soviet Union allowed self-determination of member states, including secession. I suppose he meant that if this weren’t the case, Ukraine’s independence wouldn’t have happened, because Russia would have challenged such efforts by force. The Soviet-era constitution of the Russian Federation did not recognize the right to self-determination to the point of secession, nor does the new constitution from 1993.

Contrary to all this, in his conversation with Guterres, Putin is referring to the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo that the declaration of independence is not contrary to international law, but that foreign military intervention to support that declaration and repel the efforts of Ukraine or any country to maintain or regain control of its own territory is a violation of international law, which the judgment of the International Court of Justice does not deny, because it recognizes the sovereignty of each country.

Which Guterres points out, albeit under his breath. When asked if he agrees with Putin’s interpretation, he said that “that is not the position of the United Nations”, a body in which Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council.

And that’s more or less it. Putin is referring to the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo in order to explain to the Secretary General of the United Nations why Russia’s attack against Ukraine is not in violation of international law. This, however, is directly contrary to the judgment of the International Court of Justice and the decisions of the Security Council, the two most important sources of international law.

The Serbian public, as usual, interprets instead of learning, and the worst interpretation will probably be the one according to which Putin allegedly only wanted to point out the hypocrisy and double standards of the West. The President of Russia will explain to the Secretary General of the United Nations the hypocrisy of the West, which gives Russia the right to be hypocritical, as well. And that should be the justification for Russian aggression against Ukraine?

Of course, there are always interpretations according to which all this could be useful. Because if this applies to Crimea and Donbas, and all other areas of Ukraine that will become independent with Russian conquest, the same should apply to Republika Srpska and northern Kosovo. None of this is in line with the ruling of the International Court of Justice, nor is it in line with the decisions of the United Nations, as Guterres said.

The ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo also explains in detail the role of the United Nations, and Russia itself, in the entire process of Kosovo’s independence. Nothing in that process is in any way comparable to the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

In fact, the problem that Putin faced in Ukraine, which he himself stated, after a fashion, in that same conversation, is that Donbas, rather than Crimea, might well end up faring like the Serbian secessionist territories in Croatia. While in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international agreement on which the country is based does not allow anyone to secede. Hence this unsuccessful, and worrying, attempt at justification.

Putin and Russia are violating international law with their aggression against Ukraine, and invoking the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case of Kosovo is an unfounded way to challenge that. Unsuccessful and, at the same, time very reckless.

If we forget about Kosovo and the uncertainty that such an interpretation of international law brings to the political position of Serbia for a moment, how should China understand this interpretation of international law? That Taiwan can declare independence in accordance with international law and ask the countries willing to recognize it to send troops to defend it from China’s political and military attempts to prevent that independence. This means that this could also apply to any Russian region, and practically any territory anywhere in the world.

It would be the same as saying that we have decided to move from our international legal system, such as it is, into international anarchy.

Translated by Marijana Simic

Peščanik.net, 16.05.2022.


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Vladimir Gligorov (Beograd, 24. septembar 1945 – Beč, 27. oktobar 2022), ekonomista i politikolog. Magistrirao je 1973. u Beogradu, doktorirao 1977. na Kolumbiji u Njujorku. Radio je na Fakultetu političkih nauka i u Institutu ekonomskih nauka u Beogradu, a od 1994. u Bečkom institutu za međunarodne ekonomske studije (wiiw). Ekspert za pitanja tranzicije balkanskih ekonomija. Jedan od 13 osnivača Demokratske stranke 1989. Autor ekonomskog programa Liberalno-demokratske partije (LDP). Njegov otac je bio prvi predsednik Republike Makedonije, Kiro Gligorov. Bio je stalni saradnik Oksford analitike, pisao za Vol strit žurnal i imao redovne kolumne u više medija u jugoistočnoj Evropi. U poslednje dve decenije Vladimir Gligorov je na Peščaniku objavio 1.086 postova, od čega dve knjige ( Talog za koju je dobio nagradu „Desimir Tošić“ za najbolju publicističku knjigu 2010. i Zašto se zemlje raspadaju) i preko 600 tekstova pisanih za nas. Blizu 50 puta je učestvovao u našim radio i video emisijama. Bibliografija