I leaf through Srđa Popović’s latest book, One gorke suze posle, just published by Peščanik and containing articles the author has written since 2000. It is a pungent book about the loss of hope in the aftermath of the changes of 5 October 2000, a book forcing to our attention the fact that we have learnt nothing from the alarming events of the 1990s. Popović is one of the few lawyers who did not sell out to higher powers, who did not auction his expertise.
This is no negligible feat, especially today when many sham ‘independents’ are prancing about or peacock in the light of governmental benefice, when every bush hides a politician with a law degree, an advisor or analyst hankering after a professorial post. Popovic’s book reveals many things, including, for example, that the very naming of the war that broke up Yugoslavia is contentious. The international media described it initially as a civil war, and Western politicians did the same. I accepted this terminology, because that is how it looked at the beginning; but then it gradually appeared that it was also an ethnic war. With his razor-sharp lawyer’s logic, Srda Popovic makes order from the terminological chaos.
His view is that with the adoption of a new constitution on 28 September 1990 Serbia left the Yugoslav federation and made itself an independent state. From that moment on, it is possible to speak only of international not civil wars, which means that Serbia in actual fact attacked the neighbouring states. According to the letter of that constitution, Serbia viewed [Yugoslav] federal laws as valid only if they were not in conflict with its own interests. Article 72 of that Serbian constitution states unambiguously that Serbia is a sovereign and independent state, which appropriates the powers that used to belong only to the federation. True, the constitution refers also to Yugoslavia; but is it possible for a sovereign and independent state to be subject to another sovereign and independent state? At the time of their publication, these arguments by Popović caused a sharp polemic; this soon subsided, however, and they are now no longer referred to.
This despite the fact that they are of crucial importance in judging the Yugoslav events, given that the Serbian constitution was adopted nearly a year before the Croatian and Slovenian separation. It is not surprising then that in July 1991, following the adoption of the Croatian constitution, Stipe Mesić defended it at the so-called Yugoslav presidency by pointing out that it was only a copy of the Serbian constitutional model. Croatia, in other words, followed Serbia in leaving the federation.
In addition to the circumstances of the break-up of Yugoslavia, Srđa Popović seeks to clarify in this book also the question of Kosovo, as well as the political background to the murder of prime minister Zoran Ðindić, which remains even today shrouded in secrecy. Although Popović greatly appreciates the policy pursued by the late Ðindić, he contests the accepted doctrine of the October [2000] changes. Milošević, in his view, was overthrown not by the people or the political opposition, but by the Serbian tycoons, the secret police and the army. These forces were greatly concerned that the current dissatisfaction in the country would culminate in a popular uprising that would remove not only Milošević but them too. They consequently came to the conclusion that it was necessary to consider preventive measures. They opted for a ‘revolution’, thinking that the opposition should be allowed to come to power. This is what Zoran Ðindić was confronted with. The response came. There followed the so-called strike by the ‘Red Berets’, which Srđa Popović calls an armed rebellion. Ðindić’s government had not even a minimal chance to put down the rebellion, because the ‘Yugoslav’ president of the day and supreme commander of the armed forces, Vojislav Koštunica, sided with the rebels, after which Ðindić was forced to make a series of compromises.
Ðindić’s murder, consequently, was not some shoot-out between mafia men, but a political assassination the roots of which go back to the 1990s. That decade still continues to infect our most recent history.
That Srđa Popović is right is confirmed by the new and more detailed revelations concerning the political background to Ðindić’s assassination appearing these days in our daily and Sunday press. It is difficult to say whether we shall get convincing answers to these questions. But irrespective of that, it is becoming increasingly clear that the ongoing scandals are linked to the 1990s, which means that our near past still remains to be elucidated; that it is constantly returning and intervening in our lives; and that it influences, moreover, our future. In the aftermath of 2000, many tried to convince themselves that we need not delve into the past; that we should instead look ahead; that it was most important to believe in the future. After ten years it has become quite clear that this is impossible. The ‘preventive revolution’ cannot be set aside through a ‘preventive amnesia’.
Translated by Bosnian Institute, 24.07.2010.
Peščanik.net, 30.07.2010.
