Beşiktaş is one of the most important sub-provinces of Metropolitan Istanbul. Though it is not big in size and population, it is one of the most developed sub-provinces of Turkey. Beşiktaş, located on the European side of Istanbul, is one of the city’s most vibrant and historically rich districts. Its importance stems from its unique blend of cultural, historical, economic, and social attributes that contribute significantly to Istanbul’s identity. Beşiktaş is a cultural epicenter, boasting art galleries, museums, theaters, and music venues. Strategically located by the Bosphorus, Beşiktaş serves as a critical hub for commerce and transportation. The area is bustling with businesses, cafes, and restaurants, making it a focal point for both locals and tourists. Its ferry terminals connect key parts of Istanbul, reinforcing its economic vitality.In short,Beşiktaş stands out as a microcosm of Istanbul, embodying the city’s historical depth, cultural richness, and modern vibrancy.
Rıza Akpolat, candidate of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was elected as the Mayor of Beşiktaş with 66 percent of the votes in the elections held on March 31, 2024. This young politician woke up on January 13, 2025 with a police raid while he was visiting his family residing in Balıkesir. Akpolat was brought to Istanbul and was detained for four days before being arrested on January 16 on charges of bribery and membership in a criminal organization. Following his arrest, the Interior Ministry suspended Akpolat from his duties as a temporary measure.
CHP criticized the arrest, viewing it as politically motivated and part of a broader strategy to undermine opposition-held municipalities. In response, the party has organized rallies and is formulating a plan to address the situation.
The Beşiktaş Municipal Council, composed entirely of CHP members, is expected to elect an acting mayor to ensure the continuity of municipal services.
This development has intensified political tensions in Turkey, with opposition leaders pledging to resist what they perceive as government overreach.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, speaking at the AKP’s 8th Provincial Congress in Konya, responded forcefully to the opposition’s reactions. “There are even bigger turnips in the saddlebag,” Erdoğan warned, using a Turkish idiom suggesting that the significant or more serious matters are yet to come.
Reacting to the arrest of Beşiktaş Mayor Rıza Akpolat and Erdoğan’s statements, CHP Chairman Özgür Özel spoke clearly: “What the AKP is doing today is an outright declaration of war against the CHP, we see this and accept it.”
And so the “turnip wars” started in Turkey.
Since Erdoğan used this idiom, almost all commentators focused on what he meant: Does he really have bigger turnips in the sack? Or is he bluffing? If there are, what are these bigger turnips? How will Erdoğan use this “turnip ammunition” in his war against CHP and other opposition parties?
Actually, if there is a war in politics, it started immediately after 31 March 2024, immediately after the local elections in the country.
Victory of Opposition at Local Elections
March 31, 2024 marked a historic turning point for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP). AKP was founded on August 14, 2001. The Party came to power under Erdoğan’s leadership in the general elections held on November 3, 2002 and since then, for over two decades, has maintained dominance over politics in Turkey by winning all national, local, and presidential elections. However, the 2024 local elections changed this process.
At the local elections held on March 31, 2024, Erdoğan and AKP faced a defeat for the first time as a result of significant decline in the AKP’s popularity, particularly in urban centers. Losses in key cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir represent not only a symbolic blow but also a practical setback.
On March 31, 2024, 78 percent of all voters rushed to the ballot boxes across the country. When the votes were counted, it was clear that the main opposition People’s Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) achieved a historic success, outpacing the AKP. The CHP became the first party with 37.7 percent of the votes. AKP’s share of the vote remained below 36 percent while Erdoğan’s alliance partner National Action Party could reach only 4.99 percent.
Thus, the CHP became the first party for the first time since the 1977 elections. The CHP is now the governing party in six of Turkey’s seven largest and most economically vibrant cities, and controls 35 of the 81 provinces.
While CHP emerges as the first party from the elections, other opposition parties also took their shares. For example, the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) got 5.7 percent of total votes and gained a total of 75 municipalities, including three Greater Metropolitan Municipalities.
It requires longer analysis to explain why AKP lost its leading position at the local elections in March, but it can be argued that the deepening economic crisis can be listed as the chief factor. Persistent inflation and a sharp rise in the cost-of-living eroded public trust in the government’s economic management. Many voters, particularly in urban areas, felt the effects of shrinking purchasing power and rising rents. Furthermore, people possibly became fed up with Erdoğan’s repressive governing style, erosion of democratic institutions, and collapse of the rule of law. Erdoğan’s centralization of power through a presidential system alienated many voters who viewed it as undemocratic. This sentiment was especially strong among younger voters and those seeking greater political pluralism. Also, successful governance by opposition mayors who won in the 2019 local elections, such as Ekrem İmamoğlu (Istanbul) and Mansur Yavaş (Ankara), also demonstrated an alternative to AKP rule.
Erdoğan’s mind
Since the March elections, Erdoğan probably has 2 major interlinked issues in his mind: How can AKP reclaim its power and how can Erdoğan run for the presidency, which is scheduled for May 2028.
To make the AKP the leading party again, the government must, of course, implement successful policies, increase prosperity, and address the demands of the people. However, considering the results of the local elections, all of this may not be sufficient. At the same time, the opposition, particularly the CHP-led municipalities, must be prevented from succeeding, and the opposition must be discredited as a viable alternative to governance.
It is almost impossible for the AKP, which has been in uninterrupted power for nearly 23 years, to write a new “success story”. It is already unfeasible to improve the welfare of the masses with economic policies that grow more burdensome each day, nearly eliminate the middle class entirely, and create immense income inequality in the country. Turkey is currently the second highest in the world in consumer inflation, following Argentina. There is a widespread belief that there will be no improvement in areas directly affecting citizens’ lives, such as healthcare, education, justice, and human rights. On the contrary, the situation is expected to deteriorate further.
In such a climate, Erdoğan’s only path forward is to dismantle and weaken the opposition. By obstructing the success of opposition-led municipalities, by limiting the area for maneuver for opposition leaders to produce alternative policies, he aims to make the AKP once again the default choice for voters. In short, Erdoğan is relying on the failure of the opposition rather than the success of his and AKP’s policies.
As for Erdoğan’s chance to run again in the 2028 elections, this presents a separate issue. According to the Constitution, Erdoğan cannot run for president again, as he has already served two terms. However, a constitutional amendment or a parliamentary decision to call for early elections could open the door for his candidacy. Yet, the number of deputies that the AKP and its allies currently hold in the Turkish Grand National Assembly is insufficient to pass either a constitutional amendment or an early election decision.
Erdoğan gives contradicting messages regarding his candidacy in 2028. There are statements by him stating that this is his last term. However, on several occasions, he hinted that he may run again if circumstances allow him.
It is widely believed that he has no question in his mind that he will be a candidate again. And every move by Erdoğan since the local elections must be read/understood within this context.
Also, it is very clear that his major strategy at the moment is to attack opposition-led municipalities to discredit, undermine and thus disempower the opposition.
The spark for the “disempowering” operation against opposition municipalities was actually ignited just two days after the elections, on April 2, in Van. In this easternmost province of Turkey, Abdullah Zeydan, a member of the DEM Party, who won the election, was denied his mandate by the Provincial Election Board. This development led to mass protests, resistance, and, after appeals were made, Zeydan was able to take his seat as mayor.
If you can’t win at the ballot box, appoint a trustee
Removing elected mayors and replacing them with a public official as a trustee (kayyum in Turkish) is a policy widely used by the AKP, especially since 2016. President Erdoğan’s policy of appointing trustees to replace elected municipal officials has been a highly controversial strategy in Turkish politics, raising significant questions about democracy, governance, and the treatment of opposition parties. In the last 10 years, trustees were appointed to 147 municipalities in total. The main grounds for the trustee appointments are accusations of involvement in terrorism or support for terrorist organizations.
Erdoğan’s policy of appointing trustees to elected municipalities reflects a broader trend of centralizing power and marginalizing opposition forces. While the policy is framed as a security measure, its implementation raises serious concerns about the health of Turkey’s democracy, the rights of its citizens, and the rule of law.
Until 31 March 2024 election, this policy has primarily targeted municipalities won by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP – now DEM Party), which Erdoğan’s government accuses of having ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In 2019 local elections, HDP won 65 municipalities however, by the end of 2023, only 6 of them survived the trustee appointments. 59 municipalities were governed by trustees appointed by government.
Since 2024 local election, in less than a year, until January 19, 2025, 9 trustees has been appointed to replace elected mayors. 7 of these municipalities were won by DEM (ex HDP) and 2 of them by the main opposition CHP.
Out of these 9 municipalities, Esenyurt deserves special attention. Prof. Ahmet Özer, elected mayor of Esenyurt from main opposition CHP, was detained in a police raid on his home on the morning of October 30, 2024. Police officers searched the town hall. Özer was arrested by a court in the evening on charges of ‘membership of a terrorist organization’. According to 2023 population data, Esenyurt is the sub-province with the highest population in İstanbul and Turkey. İstanbul Deputy Governor was appointed as trustee in his place.
The trustee policy serves as both a tool to weaken the opposition and a means to transfer the resources managed by municipalities to the ruling government.
According to data by the official Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), Turkey’s population at the end of 2023 was 85 million 327 thousand. Based on the 2024 election results, 73.59% of this population will be governed by opposition parties at the local level. Furthermore,cities now governed by opposition parties contribute 77.7% to the national GDP. When examining export data, an even greater disparity is evident. The provinces won by the CHP account for 79.57% of Turkey’s total exports while AKP provinces account for 18.73%.
However, appointing trustees is not the only tool employed by the Erdoğan regime to weaken opposition municipalities. In December 2024, President Erdoğan reminded the Social Security Institution of debts of municipalities and instructed the Minister of Labor and Social Security to “shake the municipalities more decisively”. This was a signal of stricter stance toward municipalities regarding their financial obligations. Following this instruction, the Ministry started to freeze the bank accounts of several municipalities that owe premium debts to the Social Security Institution and seized their assets. Interestingly enough, though almost all municipalities are indebted to the Social Security Institution, only opposition municipalities were targeted so far.
In short, the Erdoğan regime is using all available tools (legal, political, economic, financial) to seize the opposition municipalities and render them dysfunctional.
Can Erdoğan win?
Let’s assume that Erdoğan somehow managed to overcome the obstacles and announced himself as a candidate in the next presidential election. Will he win?
According to various public opinion polls, if elections were held today, both Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Mansur Yavaş would receive more votes than Erdoğan. In other words, under current conditions, Erdoğan would lose to these two potential CHP candidates in a prospective election.
A key part of Erdoğan’s strategy revolves around these strong candidates. As mentioned earlier, Erdoğan’s overall strategy is to weaken the opposition municipalities. However, an integral and fundamental part of this strategy is to discredit and weaken these two possible candidates of the CHP.
Probably he sees İmamoğlu as the main rival. There are already several court cases against İmamoğlu which may lead to a political ban for him. However, these cases are legally very weak. According to several commentators, this is the main reason for arresting Esenler and Beşiktaş mayors. They want to build a web step by step to seize İmamoğlu. The moves are seen as the government’s new crackdown attempts on Istanbul’s popular mayor.
Here, let’s look at the Beşiktaş case once again. In the indictment, the prosecutors argued that Mayor Akpolat had dirty financial relations with a businessman. However, it came to light that this businessman received numerous tenders from the ruling AKP’s municipalities, the Parliament and institutions such as the Court of Appeals. Well, of course, no investigation targeting them so far.
Another tactic is to create a rift between İmamoğlu and Yavaş, pitting them against each other. The aim is to divide and conquer the opposition. The pro-Erdoğan media’s constant attacks on İmamoğlu and the publication of polls by government-aligned research firms suggesting that “Yavaş is a stronger candidate” are likely part of this strategy. It is well-known that Kurdish voters are hesitant toward Yavaş due to his nationalist background.
If İmamoğlu is somehow barred from running, Yavaş is perceived as an easier opponent for Erdoğan. Of course, the ultimate outcome of this strategy for Erdoğan would be both İmamoğlu and Yavaş running as candidates. In such a scenario, an Erdoğan victory becomes highly likely.
In this context, predicting what the “turnips” in Erdoğan’s bag might be is hardly an act of clairvoyance. These are likely to include new trustee appointments, legal cases against prominent opposition leaders, and additional tools of pressure against municipalities. The only limit for Erdoğan, who knows no limits in using the law and public funds and resources as he pleases, is how creative he can be.
In any case, let’s hope that the voters won’t fall off the turnip truck…
Peščanik.net, 25.01.2025.