In a historic turn of events, on May 12, 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has officially announced its decision to disband and end armed struggle, marking the end of a decades-long insurgency that has defined and destabilized Turkish politics, society, and security policy since the early 1980s.
This development created a new environment in Turkey and created new fault lines. Some welcomed this decision with hope for the future of the country while others developed a more cautious approach, questioning the process. On the other hand, there are people who believe that this move is imposed by foreign forces to weaken even disintegrate Turkey.
However, no one can deny that the decision announced by the PKK is a turning point for the country. The details of the deal are not clear or public yet. Thus, where Turkey is heading is still a question mark.
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The PKK is a militant and political organization founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, initially advocating for an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Over time, the PKK’s aims evolved toward greater Kurdish autonomy and rights within Turkey, embracing a broader ideology based on democratic confederalism and social justice.
The group launched an armed insurgency against the Turkish state in 1984, sparking a decades-long conflict that has claimed tens of thousands of lives and destabilized the region. While designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, the PKK also maintains a wide-reaching network of affiliated groups in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and has played a controversial role in regional conflicts, especially in the fight against ISIS. Its continued presence in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq and its influence over Kurdish movements across borders make it a key actor in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
The conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has imposed an enormous cost on Turkey – human, economic, political, and social. While exact figures vary depending on sources and methodologies, it is estimated that over 40,000 to 50,000 people have died as a result of the conflict, including Turkish security forces, PKK militants, and civilians (both Turkish and Kurdish). According to estimates by Turkish and international human rights organizations, over 1 to 3 million people (mostly Kurds) were displaced from southeastern Turkey during peak periods of fighting, especially in the 1990s. Thousands have been subjected to torture, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial killings, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s.
Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK, was captured on February 15, 1999, in a covert international operation that involved multiple intelligence agencies and took place in Nairobi, Kenya. After being expelled from Syria in 1998 under Turkish pressure and the threat of military action, Öcalan went on a months-long search for asylum, traveling through Russia, Greece, and eventually Kenya. During this time, he was closely tracked by Turkish intelligence (MIT), with support and cooperation from Western intelligence services, though the exact extent of each agency’s role remains partly classified and debated. On February 15, 1999, Turkish intelligence agents captured Öcalan outside the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, where he had taken refuge. He was flown to Turkey in a clandestine operation and taken to İmralı Island, a high-security prison in the Sea of Marmara, where he has been imprisoned ever since.
His capture triggered massive protests and unrest among Kurdish communities both in Turkey and abroad. In June 1999, Öcalan was tried and sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 2002 after Turkey abolished the death penalty as part of its EU accession reforms. From prison, Öcalan has remained a symbolic and ideological figure for the PKK and broader Kurdish movements, periodically releasing messages and proposals for peace and political solutions, especially during ceasefire efforts.
Öcalan’s capture marked a turning point in the PKK-Turkey conflict, weakening the group’s operational capacity temporarily but also solidifying Öcalan’s role as a central figure in Kurdish identity and resistance.
First peace process: 2012-2013
While on the one hand, Turkish security forces continue to combat PKK militants, the Turkish state also attempted to neutralize the PKK through negotiations.
Initiated in late 2012, the “peace process” between Turkey and the PKK was a groundbreaking but ultimately failed attempt to resolve one of the longest-running and most violent internal conflicts in modern Turkish history. the process, often referred to as the “solution process” (çözüm süreci), involved secret negotiations between the Turkish state and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, with the aim of ending decades of armed insurgency and addressing Kurdish demands for rights, recognition, and autonomy.
The peace initiative gained momentum in 2013, when Öcalan issued a widely publicized ceasefire call during Newroz celebrations, urging PKK fighters to halt armed activities and withdraw from Turkish territory. In return, the Turkish government – led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – promised legal reforms, increased cultural rights, and steps toward political inclusion for Kurds. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) acted as an intermediary, facilitating communications between Öcalan and the PKK’s armed leadership in the Qandil Mountains in Iraq.
The most concrete outcome of this dialogue was the Dolmabahçe Protocol, a 10-point declaration unveiled on February 28, 2015, at the historic Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul. The protocol outlined a roadmap for democratization, minority rights, disarmament, and constitutional reform including recognition of Kurdish identity and language rights, local governance reforms, disarmament and reintegration of PKK militants, a new democratic constitution to replace Turkey’s 1982 military-era charter.
However, the optimism surrounding the Dolmabahçe Protocol was short-lived. Just weeks later, Erdoğan publicly disavowed the agreement, stating that “there is no Kurdish problem” and rejecting further negotiations. Tensions escalated after the June 2015 general elections, in which the HDP entered parliament with a strong showing, breaking the AKP’s parliamentary majority for the first time. Following the collapse of a ceasefire and renewed clashes between Turkish forces and PKK militants in July 2015, the peace process unraveled completely.
The failure of the Dolmabahçe Protocol and the collapse of the peace process marked a return to intense conflict, especially in southeastern Turkey, where entire urban centers were devastated by fighting. The breakdown also ushered in a period of increasing polarization, crackdowns on Kurdish political movements, and a resurgence of militarized counterinsurgency.
MHP and the new “process”
Surprisingly, the new process has been initiated by Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) in mid-2024. MHP, founded in 1969 by Alparslan Türkeş, has historically positioned itself on the far-right of Turkey’s political spectrum, advocating for Turkish nationalism, strong state authority, and conservative social values. Originally rooted in the ideology of Türk-İslam Sentezi (Turkish-Islamic synthesis), the party gained notoriety in the 1970s with its paramilitary youth wing, the Grey Wolves, which was associated with violent clashes during a time of political turmoil. Despite its controversial past, the MHP has maintained a steady presence in Turkish politics, adapting its rhetoric and alliances in response to the changing political landscape.
Under the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli since 1997, the party has played a pivotal role in Turkish governance, especially since its alliance with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2018, forming the People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı). This strategic partnership has helped President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan secure key electoral victories and pass significant constitutional reforms.
Critics argue that the MHP’s support has enabled democratic backsliding, while supporters see the party as a bulwark against separatist movements and instability. Despite fluctuations in its vote share, the MHP remains a key actor in Turkish politics, especially in shaping nationalist discourse and influencing domestic security policies.
The MHP has always adopted a very hardline stance on the Kurdish question and the PKK. The party does not recognize the Kurdish issue as an ethnic or cultural problem, but rather as a matter of national unity and security. MHP leaders have consistently framed demands for Kurdish rights or autonomy as threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity.
Regarding the PKK, the MHP supported uncompromising military and legal measures to eliminate its influence. Up until recently, the party strongly opposed peace talks or negotiations with the PKK, viewing such efforts as legitimizing terrorism. MHP instead advocates for a unified national identity centered on Turkishness and sees any form of ethnic separatism as unacceptable.
In the other end of the spectrum, we see the Democratic Peoples’ Party (DEM Party). DEM Party, formerly known as the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), is a left-wing, pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey that advocates for democracy, minority rights, gender equality, and decentralization. Founded in 2012, the party emerged as a broad coalition of Kurdish political movements, leftist groups, and civil society activists. The DEM Party primarily represents Kurdish interests, but it also promotes a pluralistic platform that includes ecological sustainability, LGBTQ+ rights, and social justice. It has been a vocal critic of government centralization and military operations in Kurdish-majority regions, calling for a peaceful and political solution to the Kurdish question.
The Turkish government and nationalist parties, including the MHP, accuse the DEM Party of having ties to the PKK, a claim the party denies. As a result, the DEM Party has faced legal crackdowns, including arrests of its leaders and efforts to shut down the party.
The relationship between the MHP, led by Devlet Bahçeli, and the DEM Party has always been one of sharp opposition and deep ideological conflict. Bahçeli and the MHP view the DEM Party, formerly the HDP, as a political extension of the PKK, which they label a terrorist organization. This accusation underpins the MHP’s calls for the closure of the DEM Party and the prosecution of its members.
Bahçeli has consistently rejected any form of dialogue or cooperation with the DEM Party, framing it as a threat to Turkey’s national unity and sovereignty. He has been a leading voice in parliament supporting legal actions, including party bans and stripping of parliamentary immunity from DEM deputies.
For its part, the DEM Party sees Bahçeli and the MHP as symbolic of the ultranationalist and repressive policies that deny Kurdish identity and political expression. The two parties represent opposing poles in Turkish politics – ethno-nationalist centralism vs. multicultural democratic autonomy – making their relationship not only adversarial but fundamental to the ongoing polarization in Turkey’s political landscape. For years, MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli refused even to talk, shake hands, or negotiate with the MPs and representatives of the DEM Party.
In such a tense political climate, it came as a major surprise, even a shock, when Bahçeli approached the DEM section and shook hands with DEM MPs during the opening ceremony of the new legislative year at the Grand National Assembly on 1 October 2024.
However, bigger surprises were yet to come.
On October 15, Bahçeli addressed Öcalan and said, “Let the terrorist leader who said ‘I am ready for any kind of service’ when he was brought to Turkey declare unilaterally that terrorism is over and his organization will be liquidated.” Bahçeli’s historic speech in the group on October 22 became one of the most important developments of this process.
The MHP leader said that if Öcalan’s isolation conditions are lifted and he declares that the organization is completely disbanded, he can speak at the DEM Party group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, noting that the PKK leader can benefit from legal regulations within the scope of the “right to hope”. Bahçeli said, “Neither Kandil nor Edirne; let the address extend from İmralı to DEM and the terror problem be completely removed from the country’s agenda. Come on, we are for it,” Bahçeli said.
And the “new process” started.
The first contact with PKK leader Öcalan was made by his nephew, DEM Party MP Ömer Öcalan, on October 24 as part of a family visit. Öcalan’s last face-to-face meeting before that was on March 3, 2020.
Ömer Öcalan said after the meeting that the PKK leader said, “Isolation continues. I have the theoretical and practical power to move this process from the grounds of conflict and violence to the legal and political grounds if the conditions arise.”
On November 26, Bahçeli took this unspecified process one step further and said, “We expect face-to-face contact between İmralı and the DEM group to take place without delay.”
Immediately after Bahçeli made this statement in the MHP group, Co-Chair of DEM Party Tuncay Bakırhan said, “If they are sincere, they will remove the obstacles in front of this application. If you are pointing to Öcalan, open his door.” On the same day, Bakırhan and the other co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları officially applied to the Ministry of Justice to go to İmralı.
The DEM Party delegation visited Öcalan at the İmralı Prison Island and carried his messages to authorities and the public. Meanwhile, the PKK, which had adopted a cautious tone from the beginning of the process, began to make statements with different tones in February. On February 7, Murat Karayılan, commander of the PKK, said that Öcalan should talk to his own forces personally, adding, “Can this end with a single call! We are a movement with tens of thousands of armed forces. And this force is not a force that has come for money, that will cut its salary and go home when told to do so.”
On February 12, a new statement came from the organization. “With Öcalan’s message, both the PKK and the state will change,” the PKK statement said, claiming that “the state should not be afraid, the state will not be destroyed and will be restructured on a democratic basis.” It also stated that the process could only succeed “if there is no serious opposition and coup intervention”.
The expected statement from Öcalan came on February 27. “All groups must lay down their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself,” Öcalan said in his letter, which was read out at a press conference called ‘Call for Peace and Democratic Society’. The PKK leader’s letter was read by the DEM Party delegation that met with him in İmralı for the third time.
Öcalan’s statement read, “In this climate created by the call made by Mr. Devlet Bahçeli, the will of Mr. President and the positive approach of other political parties towards this call, I call for laying down arms and I assume the historical responsibility of this call.”
On May 12, the PKK responded to this call: “We acknowledge the pain endured by all sides. After extensive dialogue within our ranks and among our people, we have decided to formally dissolve the PKK and transition from armed resistance to civil advocacy.”
The announcement sent shockwaves through both Turkish and Kurdish communities. Many have greeted the development with cautious optimism, while others remain skeptical, citing the PKK’s past cycles of ceasefires and renewed violence.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded with a brief yet assertive statement: “The era of terror has ended. We welcome this step but will remain alert to ensure the safety of our citizens.” Pro-government media outlets highlighted Bahçeli’s role, portraying the event as a triumph of nationalist determination and state authority.
The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), adopted a more cautious tone, urging transparency in the disarmament process and calling for protections of political rights for Kurdish citizens.
Meanwhile, in Diyarbakır and other Kurdish-majority regions, people gathered spontaneously – some to celebrate, others to reflect quietly. Among Kurdish communities, particularly those critical of both PKK violence and state repression, there was cautious optimism for a future marked by peace and democratic reconciliation.
According to analysts, the PKK’s disbandment marks a historic turning point, but it is only the first step in a long journey toward national reconciliation. Uncertainty persists regarding the reintegration of PKK fighters, the trajectory of affiliated political groups, and whether this signals a fundamental change in Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish population.
For now, Turkey stands at a pivotal moment. Though the weapons have been laid down, the legacy of conflict still resonates. Whether this moment ushers in lasting peace or a temporary lull will depend on the actions taken in the days ahead.
We will discuss the implications of these developments for Turkish politics in the next article.
Peščanik.net, 22.05.2025.
