About Islamophobia / lessons learnt

BCBI: What would you say are the main reasons for the spread of Islamophobia in the Western world?

Although the US and Europe are quite different, they do have in common the basic issue of identity and identity politics. Europeans are struggling with dealing with the immigration issue in general, but there is a broader issue of anti-immigrant parties and within that Muslims who are more significant in terms of numbers and presence in so many different countries. It then gets compounded by the issue of violence within these countries: the attacks in London, Spain and the Netherlands; and it gets hyped by politicians, commentators, or just activists and website that are, at the end of the day, anti-immigrant and specifically anti-Muslim. I think that the Norwegian terrorist, as it were, is a perfect example of that. If you look at his writings you see a very strong identity issue from his point of view as a European Christian. To some people it may be European Christian with the component of faith, for others it is just a sense of Europe as Christian in terms of history and culture, but the theory is that it is going to be threatened by the growth of Muslim populations. Then it gets combined with the kind of hate speech that has become so common coming out of this variety of groups.

Now, what is interesting here is that it raises, for example in Europe, the issue of assimilation. The things have been able to coalesce among many of the European countries to demand assimilation which then threatens the Muslim identity. If you look at, for example, the situation in Britain today, and in the number of other countries, t is reflected in the growth of anti-immigrant parties. The anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitude comes from these new political parties and is just beginning to bleed over into the main stream parties. So, in large, it has been manifested historically in the growth of new parties. In the US, I think, situation, and this is kind of notable, is different from Europe. What we saw in our last presidential and our recent congressional elections is the extent to which Islamophobia moved from the periphery to the center. The politicians who have been involved in spreading it are actually members of main stream political parties. Because of the nature of our system where we only have two parties these kind of folks do not break away and start their own party. What I think is significant here, also, is the message that comes through. These politicians who may step out far in presidential or congressional election are not simply appealing to, if you will, to “rednecks,” (uneducated racists) . In fact, the level of appeal shows that they believe that there is a significant number of, American citizens who are much more part of mainstream society, who may be well educated and hold positions. Then there are major political commentators with good educations who are very anti-Muslim in their speech and I think that is everywhere. The Park 51, so called mosque at ground zero, showed that in the protesters that came forward and particularly in what occurred afterwards when we had a tsunami like movement – anti-mosque as well as anti-sharia movement. So, I think all those factors are playing out in our society today. I think that, basically, in many of our societies we have a culture war going on.

BCBI: It is quite clear what politicians, them being right or left wing get from this debate but what do you think is the role of academic community in spreading Islamophobia?

I would like more of the academic community would speak out against Islamophobia. Although there are members who do, regrettably we don’t have enough people in American academia who, whether they belong to organizations like The Middle East Studies Association or The American Academy of the Religions, get out in public and speak out. That is because of either their disposition or the climate in which if you do step out and are very visible on these kind of issues, you come under attack.

On the other hand, you do have more right wing academics who clearly are visible and contribute to Islamophobia. You have Israeli American Martin Kramer who has done a lot of work in this area. You have Daniel Pipes, a right wing journalist, who’s trained as an academic. Then you have a variety of people (academics, media commmentators, Chritian Zionist religious leaders, who are are very staunch hard line supporters of Israel, vis-a-vis the Palestinian-Israel situation. You see that component in America, as you also do at times in Europe, among educated Islamophobes, if you will, as well as among journalists-political commentators who are well educated but are out there in front. In Europe you have people like Melanie Phillips and others.

So, I like to think that we are not as, that is, that the academy is not as infected as the broader society, but I could be wrong on that, because the academy is at times silent. The silence could come from what I said before, when people as academics just don’t take interest. They are trained scholar-teachers, and to step out in public or be a public intellectual is not something on their screen, or they are afraid to speak out. I think that you also have a silence from those academics who wind up passively contributing to this phenomenon because in fact they generally don’t agree with it, but don’t have guts to speak out.

BCBI: When earlier this year terrorist attack occurred in Norway, security pundits around the world immediately pointed the finger at the Islamic extremists. It soon turned out that their early analysis was based on prejudice alone, since the attacker was white Christian fundamentalist. What is the role of worldwide security and terrorism experts in fueling fear mongering against the Islam and Muslims?

There are good security and terrorism experts, but the fact is, this has become a booming industry. A lot of people that are jumping into it, really, at the end of the day, aren’t very trained or competent. Some of these people move from one area of the world to the other when you look at their carriers of ten or twenty years. So, it is not like they have any area specialty. They are a common security experts who opine on any part or place of the world. They are also very often driven by the realities of our market place.

The same goes for the media. The media is driven by the market, in other words, by attention, visibility, profit, audience. So, if you are not careful when you are a security or terrorism expert, including academics who deal with it, there can be a tendency to go with what will also hit the headlines. If you are at the front of this and if you jump on that explosive headline bandwagon, framing things this way is going to get attention. That seems to be the way to go. If you are proven wrong people will just say that you are proven wrong. If you take the opposite position either you are not going to get phone calls, or people are going to ignore you.

If you take a look at a number of these people and their statements, I think what is also interesting about it, I mean, people have made that point but not strongly enough, is that the media and the experts really didn’t hammer away at the terminology of “this guy is a Christian fundamentalist”, “a Christian terrorist”. In fact, even in some of the EU countries and societies there was a debate about whether this action should be called terrorism. Again, if the shooting had been on the other front, the language would have been used.

So i think that there is both, if you will, a sin of commission as well as omission. And I think that more and more one has to consider the fact that there is a wave of people, from those like Steven Emerson to political commentators, many of them on Fox and a number of them on websites with names like the patriot, American Thinker, Islam Watch, Family Security, Jihad Watch etc, who are allowed to say stuff that a significant segment of culture would wanna read, look at, or is interested in, or that will immediately get security agencies involved. So, all these things pay off for them. I would argue that they operate out of intellectual commitment but some of it is a kind of professional climbing and they are not held accountable. I mean, they can say things that they wouldn’t dare do for other groups and they can use language, that would not be permitted if you were talking, any longer today in America, about African Americans, or Jews, or even Christians.

Today you could say almost anything about Islam and Muslims that could be wrong, a libel or a slender, and just afterward say we certainly got some more information and we got it right. I remember the Oklahoma bombing. I was called by a TV station, a major TV station, as soon as it occurred and asked to address the Muslim side. I said to them: “What do we know about it?” The only reason I went on the show, at first I said no, was that they said they were gonna have Steve Emerson. In the end, of course, they were completely wrong on that. A couple of years later there was some major shooting in New York and a public television got in touch with me. They were playing the Muslim card. Again I said to them: “Do we have hard data?” And the rhetoric was that a) it was a Muslim and b) that it was done out of some sort of Muslim commitment. That was quite few years ago, let alone today’s climate.

BCBI:So how can we deal with that? What are the mechanisms? What are our tools? How can we fight that? What can society do, what can politicians do, what can academia do?

We have to take it seriously. I described Islamophobia as the new Antisemitism, and what I mean by that is not to say that Islamophobia, as much as I think it is growing dangerously and regard it as a social cancer, is of the magnitude of Antisemitism. What I am saying is that it is to Muslims what Antisemitism is to Jews, a new social cancer, a form discrimination and hate speech based on religion and/or race. If that’s the case and we get to the point when we recognize it as such, than the society would feel that it needs to move against it, that it needs to contain it. If we get to a point when to attack a mosque or a Muslim is taken as seriously as to attack a synagogue or a Jew and with the same kind of rapid widespread response, in particular when it comes to media coverage, than we have a chance to see people, whether in the media or government react and responde quickly. And if they don’t, they will be pressured by society to react more quickly, so there is the same level of response as we see to Antisemitism. The same goes for our approach to hate speech in media and society.

One of the examples that I use is: you take the statements of very strong Islamophobes like Pam Geller, Robert Spencer, Frank Gaffney and others that appear on media and substitute the words Judaism and Jews or African American or black or even Catholic. The editors would have been looking much more closely and responsibly about whether or not they would run that story, in terms of their fact checking, in terms of their making sure that the language was that of a report rather than the kind of biased and excessively explosiveand discriminatory language that we see too often. When we look at the media today we see that the language which is used and accusations which are made can be completely over the top with no accountability in the way that one is accountable, in the US or in Germany for example, when one is talking about Jews, etc. And it’s only when we press this point home, when there is enough coverage, when there is enough speaking out, when there are enough movements, that we will be able to address this social cancer effectively.

And we are not there at all. I will give you an analogous situation. If I speak at a conservative Christian college or just a conservative college, regardless of where people are coming from, if I would have made a statement that crossed the line from people’s point of view, for example, if I would be exceptionally critical of, let’s say, the state of Israel, and these were conservative Zionist Christians, they would go through the roof. They might even want to ban somebody like me from speaking there. And, yet, just the opposite would happen when it comes to Muslims. In other words, they would want to invite and hear and it would be accepted if somebody came and slammed the religion of Islam. That’s just extremism. And if only we start to expose it as much as we can and do what people like myself and others do. I speak out publicly, I travel around the country, I blog on the issue, I published a book on Islamophobia, I do media interviews. I believe more and more people need to do that. We need to mobilize our religious leaders more. It is not enough. There are religious leaders who step out and speak out, and, yes, they have many things on their plate, but they have to respond to Islamophobia and sustain it effectively just as we respond to other forms of racism and of Antisemitism. What that means is, for example, training future religious leaders when they are studying in seminaries making them sensitive to these issues, setting up and having programs at synagogues, in churches that talk about and feature these kinds of issues. We don’t go there.

I would bet you that, if you look at America and New York in terms of commemorations of 9/11, there would be a sense of controversy or inappropriateness in, while commemorating those who had died and denouncing extremism, pointing out that to engage in extremist talk when it comes to mainstream Muslims is equal in that right. I happened to hear in a church a very good sermon on 9/11. It made a lot of good issues and it talked about forgiveness. But it didn’t get into applying the idea and saying that we certainly have to avoid the notion that there is a kind of collective guilt among Muslims and alerting people to the fact that anti-mosque, anti-sharia stuff is really bad. I don’t know but I doubt that as many people as they should are getting out there. I think that there needs to be more of that kind of pressure.

For politicians it means literally mobilizing people to speak out and to vote against these politicians. Gov. Chris Christy of New Jersey and Senator Durban set a solid example of those major politicians that do speak out, but they remain a minority. I think there is movement taking place but we are not even near to what we need.

About democracy in the ME, democracy and Islam

BCBI: Many fear that democracy in the Middle East would mean an Islamist rule. What are some ramifications of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt or El Nahda in Tunisia?

This time next week I will be running a workshop in Istanbul on this very issue. It is called “The Arab spring: transitioning from dictatorship to democracy” and we are going to have activists from Egypt and Tunisia, as well members of the Muslim Brotherhood and El Nahda, including El Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi, Egyptiam presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who used to be a major Muslim Brotherhood leader, EU, American, Turkish and other officials and experts. Having said that let me make my first comment: what we see with the Arab spring is that we failed to realize that, first of all, we need a new narrative, we need a new paradigm in American and many European countries foreign policy approaches in the Middle East and broader Muslim world.

The old paradigm was that it is important to support authoritarian regimes to foster and protect Western interests: oil, security and stability and thus accepted basic approach of regimes to paint any and all opposition whether mainstream or extreme Islamist as extreme Islamists. We need a new paradigm. The Arab spring proved that through the people who came together. Therefore, the first question one should be asking, if we are talking about threat, is what threat do the military and security forces, and the entrenched elites, bureaucratic elites in Tunisia and Egypt present with regard to preventing the Arab spring from leading to democratization. But, in fact, what we do is simply talk about the Islamist threat which I will address in a second.

One of the things that you might want to look at is The Atlantic magazine. In the past four or five months there was an issue of The Atlantic and on the front page there was a woman fully covered and the title saying: “Is this the face of Arab democracy?” So when I opened it I thought that would be the title of the article inside. In fact, the article was titled “The fall of the tyrants”, in which Islamists were only a small part of the article. With regard to the Islamists, I think that one of the things that we have to realize is that when we look at the Arab spring and Egypt and Tunisia, again, the Islamists did not lead, although they were involved. Instead it was a broad section of people. For example in Egypt, Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, the official Muslim Brotherhood, hung back. It was their younger and mid level members that quietly got involved and not as officially representing the Muslim Brotherhood. So, I think that that’s important to realize. Islamists weren’t the leaders of the movement and the officials tended to hang back just like a number of major Muslim religious figures who only jumped in at the last minute.

I think that what one has to realize also is that when you look at the Muslim Brotherhood and El Nahda, and if you look at them even before the revolution, the development of their ideology and certainly if you read Ghannouchi’s writings and others’ and positions they have taken, they have in fact broadened their ideology to include a more democratic and pluralistic approachs. It doesn’t mean that people may not still be concerned about what are their real intentions, but I would say the same thing about what are the real intentions of secular elite who thrived under dictators like Mubarak and Ben Ali?

I think that one does need to be concerned about, for example in Egypt, the emergence of some of hard line political Salafi types who stepped out. And, of course, some of what they want and claim in terms of the kind of government, would be an issue. Now, having said all that let me now make one final point on this. In the past, when the Brotherhood and El Nahda were able to participate in the elections they often won more votes than they would have if there had been a strong multi party system. In other words they got the votes not only of their real followers and sympathizers, but they also pulled in the votes of people who wanted to vote against the government. Now, in the short term they may do better than they should do. Gallup for example had a poll post Tahrir square, which showed that, in fact, the number of Egyptians who are supporters of the Brotherhood surprisingly was considerably bellow 25 percent and that, in fact, many people were looking for different kind of party or candidate. But if you had weak political parties in the first round of elections, that is now versus let’s say four years from now, these groups may do better because there aren’t strong alternatives. However, I believe that as you get stronger multi party systems and people have many different alternatives Islamists will simply be part of, if you will, political landscape, the mosaic, and not have maybe a disproportionate representation.

BCBI: As the Arab spring was happening we have seen many pictures of veiled young women participating in the street protests, playing a significant role in revolutions. How will this affect their position in the society?

Well, this is one of the questions. Will it be like years ago when the Algerians got their independence from the French and then after the revolution women in effect, many of them, were expected to, in general, go back into home? But I think that situation is changed considerably. Not all, but many women who veil now are, in fact, educated and trained and socially active. So I don’t think they will withdraw. And a number of the Islamist women that I know who wear hijab rather than the full face cover had been active in society in recent years and certainly were active and continue to be active in terms of the Arab spring. I think that we could definitely expect that they will continue to be active. In fact I will have a workshop where we will have a number of Islamist women participating. This is particularly true with the younger generation.

BCBI: What would you say should be the role of the Ulema in the Middle East after the Arab spring?

Well, in my own opinion and especially if you, for example, look at the Gallup world poll, which was done before the Arab spring, of some 35 countries across the world, it is very clear that majority of Muslims do not believe that the Ulema should be playing a leadership role or determining laws, etc. Majority believe that they should have an advisory role. I think that certainly that should and will remain the case. Majorities of population do not want to see the Ulema play any other role. Majorities of population, even if they are people who see themselves as practicing Muslims or observant Muslims or believing Muslims, don’t necessarily want to see religion as the dominant force in society. Majorities do want to see religion as providing a moral compass and therefore that their laws and their values not be contrary to their religion. But, there certainly is distancing and I think it is important to know that, as I alluded to briefly before, in many cases you got a history in a number of these countries where a religious establishment disappointed by dealing or was compliant in dealing with the political establishment. So, the credibility of the Ulema has also often been at stake in these societies. Let alone, you also have a sector of the society that regard many of the Ulema, as high level well educated as they are, as traditionally educated and irrelevant to speak with any authority on modern problems.

BCBI: Does reformist current in Islam have power? (What is the real power of reformists within Islam?)

Well, I refer to reformists in Islam as a vanguard and I compare it to many social and religious movements. They begin decades, maybe half a century, a century before reformist spirit, a movement. It starts with a small number of people and grows. Then you can wind up with vanguard that has a certain kind of influence and leverage but is still a kind of minority sentiment. I would play on the comparison with Roman Catholicism. The reformers in Roman Catholicism functioned for decades before Vatican II. They were up against a church hierarchy and a church that was very conservative. Therefore, they tended to be suppressed, marginalized, looked down upon, dismissed, etc. But that vanguard which has its stuff in there began to grow. If you look at the Muslim world today, if you would generalize, one would have to say that not all, but the majority of religious leaders have been conservative. And therefore, the kind of religious interpretation that has been promoted has been a conservative form of religion. Not necessarily anything that is particularly violent or dangerous just conservative interpretation. That’s were the momentum is, and obviously if that has been the case than it means that the current generation of parents and grandparents, who went to mosques and to schools where they were exposed to religion, have conservative interpretation. Now, you have this vanguard of reformers from Egypt and Tunisia. In my most recent book called “The Future of Islam” I have a whole chapter on it – who are the preachers, religious thinkers and authorities who are reformers. So you got this vanguard of reformers but they still remain a minority.

Now, one interesting wrinkle here, though, is that while many of these reformers are people whose interpretation is based on what one might call ijtihad or reinterpretation, one could identify some of them as more neo-modernist or progressive reformers. Many of them might have both the religious but also a very sophisticated modern western education, like, for example, Mustafa Ceric, the grand mufti of Bosnia, who went to Al Azhar but got a PhD at the University of Chicago. So, you get that kind of profile, or laymen who have that kind of profile. But you also have some of more traditionally educated figures – like the grand mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa or Al Tayyeb, the current sheikh of Al Azhar. And they can argue to the same, if you will, reformist conclusions even though they use the more traditional methodology. So they are also thought of as a vanguard. But it is important to realize that this is not the dominant movement but a movement that seeks to be and would see itself as the wave of the future. So far it has had to deal with both authoritarian states and also conservative religious leaders who are resistant to some of the changes that they are talking about. Nevertheless, those changes are taking place in terms of opinions and fatwas that are occurring with regard to, for example, women. The status of women – whether or not there can be women judges, qadis, or women muftis, and even pushing for reforms in the understanding of issues like apostasy, religious pluralism. But you got the forces of conservatism that are also there.

About current issues:

BCBI: Is Egyptian democratic transition threatened by current situation there? Will supra constitution, if passed, stand on the way of democratic consolidation in Egypt?

There are couple of them, but to me one of the biggest concerns is that you got a very diverse movement. As with all, if you will, revolutions or popular uprisings, we saw that with the French revolution and its aftermath, the American revolution, when you have a diverse sector who may be able to pull together this diverse group of people to work together is something that you want to get rid of and force something that you want. After the revolution you wind up with the debate about: ok, well we know broadly or generically what we want – greater political participation, accountability, etc. But what does that really mean? Can we come to an agreement, can there be a unity that moves us forward even though we still have diverse political perspectives.

Obviously, that’s what happens in democracies where, in fact, you have people who offer at times very conflicting political positions but there is a glue that keeps them together and enables them to move forward. So, that’s going to be a challenge, especially since you are dealing with countries where people have grown up, generations have grown up within a culture of authoritarianism with all of its values and had not had strong civil societies.

What is than the threat to this? I would say entrenched elites. In Egypt, for example, the military, the security forces,the bureaucratic structures and the old political party used to have a lot of power. So, the question is to what extent will these people actually try to undermine, to slow down, to, if you will, try to grab the current of the revolution, actually, to their own advantage. And the same thing is true in Tunisia. What you often see is that entrenched elites in Tunisia and Egypt are out there warning that OMG it is the religious sector that is somehow corrupted.

But I think that you have different currents here. On the religious side the risk can be the extent to which you wind up with not so much your mainstream leaders, activist leaders, but your more extremist fringe. They can increase fear and uncertainty through their rhetoric and actions that they may engage in. So, for example, within Egypt you may wind up with small, not necessarily representative, but violent Salafi militants attacking Coptic churches or Copts. That of course feeds fears regarding safety and security. For example, Gallup has just made a study which shows that while fear of growth of violence and lack of security in society has grown in Egypt, the statistics show that, in fact there is no significant growth. So, you got those fears and, for example, if somebody is worried about Islamists, and has grown up in a society where the entrenched always played on the idea that real threat to the society are the Islamist activists, both mainstream and the extremists, and than after the revolution you wind up with, all of the sudden, militant Salafis stepping out in front calling for formal Islamic state, or you have an attack against the Coptic church, you begin to see that as potentially the wave of something that could come and get you where you are.

We see a reflection of this in Syria. If you look at recent stories in Syria, you have Syrian Christians, who, as they look to what happened to Christians in Iraq from the extremists, and when they see some of the attacks that have been taking place in Egypt, begin to think, well, as bad Asad is, what might be unleashed in our society!

BCBI: Syrians are protesting the regime for the past six months. It is isn’t clear how and when Asad’s rule will come to an end. How do you see the situation in Syria develop? What is it that Syrian opposition lacks to be able to oust Asad? Is it possible to resolve impasse in Syria by an international intervention?

I think all of that is interconnected. When people looked at Asad they would say that you have a jammy generation of the educated in the west, who went to really good schools and are liberal minded. Asad was this trained eye specialist. His wife is very modern. But, at the end of the day, having come home to be president, he has become the son of his father. And part of the reason he became a son of his father politically is the fact that he inherited a state structure, a military structure, a family structure that even if he had wanted it to be significantly different, he probably couldn’t have, since that kind of establishment has its interests.

On the other hand, you have, now, a broad based opposition but it is somewhat undermined by certain sectors of the society: by those who have benefited under Asad’s rule and also those, like a part of the Christian community, that is driven by fears of what might come. You see that also reflected in the statements, just the other day, by the Lebanese Maronite patriarch saying: “Give Asad a chance he is still kind of like a young boy”. This almost indirectly, to use his Christian language, baptizes this notion.

Now, the problem with Syrian situation is that it is more complicated for the international community. The Israelis, I think, clearly would prefer Asad to what might come after him. Even though the US doesn’t like Asad and has a problem with him and has spoken out against him, the real question remains how far will the international community, whether the US or the EU, be willing to go when there is unknown. Add to that a debate in the US administration on the way it has handled Netanyahu, which moved from asking for the freeze of settlements to the president walking away from that position, and then the situation with the UN vote, and we’ve got a very difficult situation here. It gets compounded by the fact that the international community has gotten involved in one way or another in Egypt and Tunisia, and particularly in Libya. So, the Syrian opposition is, in a way, coming to this very late because Asad has been willing to use his military brutally and therefore at times to slow down that momentum. Libya is still not resolved.

And, for a lot of reasons, the international community is going to be, I think, slow in terms of being very proactive with regards to Syria beyond rhetoric and some restrictions. I think that the international community needs to be more supportive, but at this point it is hard to see what that would mean concretely in terms of leverls of commitment, actions and policies. I am not sure, this is not my area, about how much more one could do in the realm of let’s say, sanctions, or affecting Syrian investments overseas, so it is hard for me to talk in specifics about what needs to be done. I can generalize and say that there needs to be even more concerted effort in terms of language and back door diplomacy on the part of the EU and the US, and I just don’t know how involved we really are in assuring that that is the case.

BCBI: Can you comment for us Palestinian move to apply for statehood in the UN and US position on the issue?

What other kind of move is left for the Palestinians? I think that the US position is counter productive, quite frankly, it is appalling. If we are talking about the Palestinians, the Israelis and the US, and I am not a great supporter of Mr Abas, but I think that the Israelis have proven themselves to be absolutely intransigent. Netanyahu has proven himself, just like when he was prime minister the first time, to be somebody who talks about being opened to negotiations but basically does exactly what Shamir did. That is, you just talk, you put out lines, but you do nothing and seek every occasion and every slight variance that takes place among the Palestinians to than say that there is no way forward.

Netanyahu has also been taking on the president of the United States frontally. In a sense, he has dressed down the president. He has come to the United States and appealed to the American population through APAC, speaking at their meetings. In the American Congress, on one occasion, he has managed to get statement of broad support, and on the other, to actually get far bigger applause than the American president has gotten – 27 rounds of standing ovations, orchestrated, not spontaneous, in the face of the president of the United States. Then, right after the vote, he has undermined the president of the United States by actually picking up some of the themes in Obama speech before the UN, projecting even more Obama administration and the president as, in fact, being hand in glove with the Israelis not only in their ultimate position but even in rhetoric that is used. So, in many ways he undermined the president. Then, he announces new settlements which fly in the face of the Palestinian leadership and even more discredit the position that the United States has taken in coming out against the Palestinian move in the UN.

It discredits position of the United States that this should be the two states solution and the only way to do it is to have two sides come to the table and talk. Netanyahu demonstrated that he has no respect for the Palestinians nor for this administration and that he feels that he is above the law, that he is above international law. And he’s been allowed to get away with it.

Interviewer Marija Marović, Balkanski centar za Bliski istok, November 2011.

Pescanik.net, 03.11.2011.

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