To The District Public Prosecution

Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime


MILA ĐINĐIĆ and GORDANA ĐINĐIĆ FILIPOVIĆ, the undersigned, through their attorney and as per power of attorney which they attach hereto, hereby submit within the meaning of Article 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the following


Against (1) MILORAD ULEMEK, a former commander of the JSO;

                (2) DUŠAN MARIČIĆ, a former commander of the JSO;

                (3) ZVEZDAN JOVANOVIĆ, a former deputy commander of the JSO;

                (4) VESELIN LEČIĆ, a former security head of the JSO;

                (5) “MIĆA” PETRAKOVIĆ, s former member of the JSO’s Command;

                (6) DRAGOSLAV KRSMANOVIĆ, s former member of the JSO’s Command;

                (7) DRAGOŠ RADIĆ, s former member of the JSO’s Command;

                (8) VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA, the former President of the FRY;

                (9) ACO TOMIĆ, a former head of the Military Security Department;


Early in November 2001 suspect MILORAD ULEMEK, a long-standing commander of the Special Operations Unit (JSO) who had retained effective control of the unit even after the formal termination of his function, suspects DUŠAN MARIČIĆ, VESELIN LEČIĆ, ZVEZDAN JOVANOVIĆ, ‘MIĆA’ PETRAKOVIĆ, DRAGOSLAV KRSMANOVIĆ and RAGOŠ RADIĆ, in their capacity as members of the Command of the JSO, together with the late Dušan Spasojević, the then head of the ‘Zemun Clan’ criminal gang, organised unlawful actions of the JSO intended to threaten the constitutional organisation and security of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), in which the JSO disobeyed their superiors, withdrew all the Unit’s members to the barracks located in Kula, cut off all the barracks’ telephone lines with their superiors and the outside world, took away the Unit’s members’ mobile phones, withdrew their personnel attached to protected persons’ security details and the security corps of Belgrade International Airport, and, fully armed, using 24 ‘Hummer’ combat vehicles, blocked part of the main highway running through Belgrade near the ‘Sava Centre’, and, threatening to use force, issued a demand for the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia to adopt a law on co-operation with the Tribunal at the Hague (ICTY), and for the replacements of a lawfully elected member of the Government, the Minister for Internal Affairs, and of the lawfully appointed head and deputy head of the State Security Service, all with the aim of placing that Service under their own control and preventing its legally-prescribed functioning, in which endeavour they succeeded, which led to a grave endangerment of the security and constitutional order of the country, culminating in the assassination by the Unit’s members in 2003 of the then Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Đinđić,

suspect VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA, at the time in a capacity of the President of the FRY and commander of the armed forces, failed to perform his constitutionally prescribed duty proceeding from Article 135, paragraph 1 and in connection with Article 133, paragraph 1 of the then Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Official Gazette of the FRY, No 1/92) and in his capacity as the commander of the armed forces take steps to suppress the insurrection, but, quite to the contrary, in a public address at a news conference, (Tanjug News Agency, 15th November 2001) justified the insurrection and encouraged it, describing it without any foundation as a justified strike, although he was aware that at the time police personnel were banned by the Constitution from organising strikes (Article 57, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the FRY),

suspect ACO TOMIĆ, at the time of the insurrection the head of the Military Security Department, during a meeting held at the Military Security Department premises with suspect Milorad Ulemek and the late Dušan Spasojević on 12th November 2001, guaranteed to the same that the Army would not interfere in the ongoing insurrection, thereby strengthening their resolve to persevere in their armed insurrection,

where the following would commit:

suspects MILORAD ULEMEK, DUŠAN MARIČIĆ, VESELIN LEČIĆ, ZVEZDAN JOVANOVIĆ, “MIĆA” PETRAKOVIĆ, DRAGOSLAV KRSMANOVIĆ and DRAGOŠ RADIĆ, the criminal offence of organising an armed insurrection defined in Article 124 paragraph 2 of the Basic Criminal Law, punishable under Article 139, paragraph 1 of that Code;

suspect VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA, the criminal offence of armed insurrection defined in Article 124 paragraph 1 in connection with Article 24 paragraph 1 and in connection with Article 30 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Basic Criminal Law;

and suspect ACO TOMIĆ, the criminal offence of armed insurrection defined in Article 124 paragraph 1 in connection with Article 23 paragraph 1 of the Basic Criminal Law.


THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: ‘reform’ and ‘patriotic’ blocs

The criminal offence of armed insurrection with which the suspects in this complaint are charged is listed among offences against the constitutional organisation and security of the country. Such an offence is in fact an attack on fundamental political values, and can therefore be seen as a political act. In order to understand the meaning and ‘social radius’ of such an offence, it is necessary to place it within the framework of the political environment in which it takes place.

Immediately after the overthrow of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and the assumption to power of the Democratic Opposition (DOS) two diametrically opposed blocs were formed within that diverse coalition of parties, nicknamed the ‘reform bloc’ and the ‘patriotic bloc’. Their main differences were: (1) their understanding of the nature of the changes that happened on 5th October 2000, and (2) their attitudes to the wars of the 1990s and the regime of Slobodan Milošević.

The ‘reform bloc’, headed by Zoran Đinđić, saw the October events as a revolution in which the citizens had overthrown by force a dictatorial regime and brought the DOS to power; while the ‘patriotic bloc’, headed by suspect in this complaint Vojislav Koštunica, interpreted those events as a normal electoral change of government.

By necessity, other differences grew out of these.

The ‘reform bloc’ called for a complete break with the wartime legacy and the belligerent policies of the former regime and for comprehensive changes in all areas of society, including cadre changes, especially in the unreformed and criminalised security service structures, which by definition implied fulfilment of international obligations to the ICTY.

On the other hand, the ‘patriotic bloc’, in line with its view of 5th October 2000 as a normal electoral change of government, proclaimed continuity with the former regime, championed the idea of ‘legalism’ – retaining the legal framework of the old regime, and opposed ‘revanchism’ (assessing the responsibility of the Milošević apparatus), ‘settling accounts with political opponents’, ‘revolutionary measures’. Suspect in this complaint Vojislav Koštunica explained the aforementioned thinking in an interview given immediately after the assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić, on 27th March 2003 to Aleksandar Timofejev on B92.: “I am not a supporter of ‘6th October’, I prefer things in Serbia to change by the day and by the month… When someone says ‘6th October’, he says ‘revolution’. He says what was done in October 1944, throughout Serbia, but especially in Belgrade, when a certain number of intellectuals were executed by firing squad to serve as examples.”

These profound political differences between two ideologically and politically bitterly opposed blocs were further aggravated by the fact that the two blocs had divided between themselves the two most important functions of the executive – the function of president of the republic, and the function of the prime minister. Thereby the first of the two achieved control of the military and its security service, and the other of the ministry of internal affairs and the security services. A situation arose which some observers correctly described as a ‘duality of governance’.

Very quickly and by the very nature of things, the conflict between the blocs focused on the issue of co-operation with the Hague Tribunal, which came to symbolise all other political differences.

In championing the policy of continuity, Vojislav Koštunica was outspokenly the biggest adversary of the ICTY. In his very first appearance on TV immediately after 5th October 2000, he made his now famous statement: “…for me the Hague is the fifth wheel”, and then followed this with numerous similar statements – that he saw co-operation with the ICTY as “neither a priority nor a vital political interest” (Politika, 14th February 2001), “…the country has many more important interests than that co-operation…” (Politika, 15th October 2000, 21st October 2000; 1st February 2001). The profound opposition to co-operation with the ICTY was legalistically explained by the necessity to adopt a law on the Hague to regulate that co-operation. Such a law would be completely unnecessary for the purposes of fulfilling an international obligation that had already been assumed, but insistence on it served to buy time and delay a start to co-operation.

On the other hand, the overall programme orientation of Zoran Đinđić’s government, viewed seriously, meant the taking of concrete steps in respect of Serbia’s obligations to the international community without delay, in particular the handover of the Serbs indicted for war crimes by the ICTY, all the more so as this was a condition for receiving assistance in reconstructing a devastated economy.

In June 2001, the Government surrendered Slobodan Milošević to the ICTY and thereby showed its determination to change attitudes towards the recent past, nationalistic ideology and the surrounding countries. Serbia’s path to a European future lay through its past and the ICTY. The handover escalated the conflict between the blocs to a status of white heat.

Suspect in this complaint Koštunica described the Government’s move as a ‘coup d’etat’. “This may be interpreted as a serious threat to the constitutional order of the country… This has been taken from the arsenal of Milošević’s policies: lawlessness, humiliating moves no one in the international community had even asked for… Not even the most basic procedure was respected, just as if someone here, not someone outside, was in a hurry to fulfil as rapidly as possible an obligation taken no one knows when, where and from whom. This is not a path that can lead us towards the future, towards Europe, the world. We cannot get far without a prosperous and dignified state.” (Politika, 29th June 2001) Further aggravating the crisis, a few days later Koštunica’s Democratic party of Serbia (DSS) walked out of the DOS caucus in the Serbian parliament, and its prominent representatives continued to make statements claiming that the constitutional order was threatened (Dejan Mihajlov, the president of DSS’s caucus, in: Politika, 30th June 2001; Dušan Budišin, in: Politika, 3rd July 2001). In a statement made to the press of Turin, Italy, Koštunica said that a “limited coup d’etat attempt” had taken place. (Politika, 10th July 2001) (cited according to Dr Dubravka Stojanović, ‘Ulje na vodi’, Belgrade, 2010).

It is clear where the ‘Red Berets’ (JSO) stood in this conflict, as many of its members were in fear of the ICTY as they were steeped in all sorts of political assassinations, war crimes and traditional crime, as it is clear at whose disposal those forces had to place themselves. It is clear that the JSO had no particular political outlook and that by its armed insurrection it served simply as a blind tool in the struggle between the two aforementioned political blocs, just as it had been a tool in the hands of Milošević’s ‘patriotic’ regime. Suspect in this complaint Ulemek formulated it best himself: “We [the JSO] are the bullet, the trigger is pulled by someone else, and we travel where we were aimed” (Blic, 4th December 2000).

The armed insurrection was organised under the slogan ‘STOP TO THE HAGUE’, as was determined at the trials of those charged with Đinđić’s murder. The insurrection shook the very foundations of Đinđić’s government, as it showed who were Serbia’s true masters. Milošević’s handover and the armed insurrection of the JSO, which received the support and protection of suspect in this complaint Vojislav Koštunica and the tacit approval of the military security service, were effectively the beginning of the writing of a death sentence for Zoran Đinđić.


According to a report of the Commission of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, DT 72 No. 00-002/2003/86 dated 13th August, kept in the documentation of the Special Department of the District Court in Belgrade under No., the Commission in charge of looking into the events of November 2001 in which the JSO took part, it was concluded that the event constituted an armed insurrection headed by suspect in this complaint Milorad Ulemek. It was also noted that during the insurrection suspect in this complaint Ulemek urged JSO personnel to “forgo your professional obligations and return to your barracks,” including even those employed in a number the personal security details, and to block roads in Kula and the central highway in Belgrade near the ‘Sava Centre’.

It is also generally known that the JSO tried to justify this action by allegedly having been tricked into arresting two ICTY fugitives, the Banović brothers.

Further details of the insurrection came from Zoran Mijatović, a former deputy head of the Security Service, in testimony given on 28th December 2004 at the trial of Ulemek and others. ( 5/03 of the Special Department of the District Court in Belgrade; Special Prosecution document No. – hereinafter in this complaint, this case will only be described as ‘’): “All of them [JSO personnel] were summoned to Kula by mobile phone, to an urgent meeting, and then, as I learnt later, their phones and their weapons were taken from them, they were placed in certain rooms and thereafter forced to give their consents to what a group of people who organised [demanded] it demanded that they accept, to stand behind the demands formulated there”.

Witness Vladimir Popović said at the trial hearing in case No. on 16th May 2005: “Besides the foregoing, I think I explained it in detail last time. I can repeat it word for word. Who they are, what they are, what is the role of Milorad Luković [suspect in this complaint Ulemek], what are the roles of the JSO’s men, that there are maybe ten or fifteen of them who are in it, not more, but that ‘Legija’ [Ulemek] is treated by all of them as the absolute master, and this means that irrespective of that fact that there are a dozen or a score of them involved in crime, all two hundred of them look on Legija as if he were God himself, and also live in fear of the men at the top”.

At the same proceedings witness Vladimir Popović described the JSO in the following manner: “JSO personnel are mainly simple people, uneducated people, most of them never even finished primary school… To them, those who had brought them in were their absolute rulers and masters… It was very easy to instrumentalise those people.” On 13th April 2005, witness Popović said more about JSO personnel: “Many JSO men are uneducated, without even primary school education. You walk into a village near Knin and find someone whose father, mother, brother, sister and animals were killed, and he is only interested in vengeance. That was the type of people they took on. Most such people were then brought to Belgrade or to Kula. To them, the people who brought them in were their absolute rulers and masters.”

In the same case, 5/03, in a statement given to the investigating judge on 23rd May 2003, defendant Saša Pejaković described the insurrection as follows: “While I was working with Spasojević on security detail, on one occasion ‘Legija’ ordered us to go to the Unit in Kula… After we had arrived at the JSO headquarters in Kula, ‘Legija’ summoned all of us in the security unit, about ten of us. On the spot, he dismissed two or three… who were JSO members. To the others he said that from that moment – I cannot recall the exact phrase – we were in a state of insurrection or a state of protest, and that those unwilling to participate should return their handguns and official IDs and walk away. No one dared go against him. I do not know if ‘Legija’ gave the reason for the insurrection on that occasion.”

After the insurrection had commenced, witness in case 5/03 Goran Petrović, at that time the head of the Republican State Security Service (RDB), described the JSO’s insubordination: “After that, a telefax arrived in my office, and later I learnt also the office of minister Mihajlović, who was on an official trip, reading more or less as follows: ‘The Special Operations Unit, as you already know, has performed a disgraceful act, a traitorous act, and stupid things, and because of that will no longer obey the command of its superiors” – that is, me, and the Minister for Internal Affairs, Dušan Mihajlović.’ I tried to contact them, but by then they had already, I do not know on whose orders, I suppose those who had organised the whole thing, severed all links with the outside world, which means that no one answered any of the phones in Kula, both the ordinary lines and the special lines. We later learnt that they had collected all the mobile phones from the Unit’s men and locked away all other phones.”

Petrović’s deputy Zoran Mijatović testified in the same case: “The Unit refused to receive Goran Petrović”, who had tried to negotiate with them.

According to the testimony of suspect in this complaint Ulemek ( 5/03, trial hearing, 14th June 2004), it is evident that the then commander of the JSO, Dušan Maričić, had resisted his superiors’ attempts to calm the situation: “Maričić tried to contact the head of the Service once again… The Head of the Service chastised him and asked him who had given him the right to cut off all links in Kula, and ordered him to make his way immediately to the headquarters of the Service in Belgrade… a short argument with the head of the Service followed, and the commander mainly refused [it]… About two hours later the then deputy, Mijatović, arrived in front of the gate of the centre, accompanied in the car by the then head of the Seventh Department, Milorad Bracanović. They did all they could to enter the Unit… the commander did not want to receive them, but instead took from them a written order issued by the Command… Mijatović took the paper and literally threw it at the commander… and told him, “You have no right to make any demands, you either calm down this situation, or we take a different line.” Commander Maričić… began a verbal exchange with the deputy and the meeting ended, I can say, disastrously.”

This is also confirmed by the then assistant commander for security of the JSO, Veselin Lečić, heard as a witness on 10th November 2004 in case No. 5/03. Asked by the presiding judge whether any verbal order had been issued to the Unit to return to its barracks, Lečić said: “There probably was, if commander Maričić had contacts. I do not know whom he contacted in that period, during the protest and later, but there probably was some pressure on us or order to suspend the protest, and I remember, when we were [on the highway in Belgrade] that the deputy head of the Service did issue an order of that kind to him – told him that the protest had to stop. It was the deputy head of the Service who talked to Maričić there, because he had no other contacts with Maričić, who did not want to talk to him in that period. But they did meet [on the highway] and they talked about that issue.”

According to the testimony of Milorad Ulemek during the trial in case No. given on 13th July 2004, the insurrection was headed by members of the “Command of the JSO – the six highest-ranked officers… who made up the core of that Command…”

Asked by Judge Nata Mesarević who the six officers were, suspect in this complaint Ulemek replied: “Duško Maričić, Zvezdan Jovanović, Mića Petraković, Dragoslav Krsmanović, Dragiša Radić and Veselin Lečić.”

According to testimony given by cooperating witness Zoran Vukojević in case No. 5/03 at the trial on 13th April 2004, “At that time ‘Legija’ was in Kula and commanded the insurrection.” In case No. K.p.broj 5/03, defendant Saša Pejaković told the investigating judge on 23rd May 2003: “During the insurrection, as I have said, the main real commander was ‘Legija’.”

In the same case during the trial on 11th April 2005, witness Čedomir Jovanović confimed that during the insurrection he had negotiated with suspect in this complaint Ulemek in the officers’ mess of the JSO, and had on that occasion agreed with him that Dušan Mihajlović should be called to Kula. Jovanović said that “Milorad Ulemek was the commander of the JSO from the very first moment… Maričić was afraid of [Ulemek’s] shadow… What is clear to me now and what was already clear to us during the insurrection is the fact that the command of the JSO was completely subservient to the informal influence of the former commander, Milorad Ulemek…”

Ulemek himself, heard a witness in the same case, confirmed at the trial on 14th June 2004 that he himself had negotiated in the name of the JSO: “I went to the Ministry [of internal affairs]. They took me directly to the minister’s office… Lukić and Professor Andrija Savić were also there… We agreed on that occasion that the Unit would be separated from the State Security Service and placed under the direct command of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, and that operational command of the Unit would be held by the departmental head, General Lukić, and Minister Mihajlović…”

Dušan Mihajlović, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, gave a similar assessment in the same case at the trial on 15th March 2005: “During the insurrection and the events surrounding it, looking at the contacts members of the JSO had with others, we understood, or at least I understood, for the first time, the scale of the influence on the Command of the JSO of … not only Mr. Luković [suspect in this complaint Ulemek), but also the others we are mentioning here – Dušan Spasojević, Ljubiša ‘Čume’ Buha and those guys, because they appear directly in the organisation of the insurrection and support given to it.”


One of those who took part in the insurrection was the late Dušan Spasojević, then the head of a criminal organisation nicknamed the ‘Zemun Clan’, who also exerted a lot of influence on the JSO’s Command, and on some occasions even negotiated on its behalf.

This can be seen from the following testimonies given in case No. 5/03:

In testimony given at the trial on 18th May 2005, Goran Petrović, the then head of the RDB, said: “When the insurrection broke out, we already had a lot of relevant knowledge, and due to the fact that because of their extensive criminal records a number of JSO members were being monitored by the RDB, we of course had knowledge, confirmed during the insurrection, in particular intercepted telephone conversations, some of which have been made public, in which some JSO personnel were talking to Spasojević, to Buha… As far as Buha or Spasojević are concerned, for them the instrumentalisation of the Unit was very important in some of their criminal activities.”

The role of the late Dušan Spasojević is also confirmed in his testimony by witness Čedomir Jovanović, at the trial on 11th April 2005: “What is clear to me today, and what was already clear to us during the insurrection, is the fact that the command of the JSO was completely subservient to the informal influence of the former commander, Milorad Ulemek, and that at the same time top JSO officers had extensive links with the head of the ‘Zemun Clan’, Dušan Spasojević, the man who practically coordinated the action and was very often present both in the town of Kula and the centre of the JSO.”

Witness Čedomir Jovanović claims that Spasojević even negotiated in the name of the JSO: “It was an unpleasant conversation, a brief conversation in which Spasojević did not conceal his intentions or left any doubt about his own role and his importance in the JSO. He effectively behaved as a representative of the JSO. He said the protest would go all the way, that Mihajlović and Petrović would be replaced, that they have the support of everyone else, and in this he left no room for any doubt.”

Dušan Spasojević’s motive was to preserve the Unit and suspect in this complaint Ulemek as its (informal) commander, in order to ensure the unimpeded lucrative criminal activity of the ‘Zemun Clan’, which Spasojević headed. The protection the JSO provided for Spasojević’s ‘Zemun Clan’ has been proved by the judgements issued by the Special Department for Organised Crime, as has also been proved that Spasojević abundantly funded the JSO, and that in many criminal offences Clan members and JSO personnel participated as co-perpetrators. In case No., on 13th April 2004, cooperating witness Zoran Vukojević talked about Dušan Spasojević financing the JSO: “They had excellent co-operation. JSO personnel acted as Dušan Spasojević’s bodyguards. They worked together with us. They were paid by Dušan. Dušan bought cars for them. Concretely, he bought for the JSO about 50 handguns, parachutes, I don’t know, some vehicles. It was also planned to purchase a building for housing in Novi Sad. I don’t know what’s come of that. He bought a flat for Gumar. Leo also got a flat. Škene got a flat. Pavas got a flat and a car from Dušan. That’s it, more or less. More or less every month they financed the wages of the bodyguards of Dušan, and for ‘Legija’ and a few others, payments were made in Kula.”


According to the testimony of Dušan Mihajlović, the then minister of internal affairs, in case No. 5/03 on 15th March 2005, “…the demands made by the Unit were … adoption of a law on co-operation with the Hague, which is a purely political matter, in fact a legislative matter, a thing for the parliament to worry about, and not the police. Their second demand was also … purely political, as they demanded the replacement of the minister – my resignation – and the replacement of the head of the RDB … I treated it as an armed insurrection. The RDB also saw it as such. I described it as an insurrection, and the Government also did so in its first communiqués, and it had all the elements of one, because if someone given weapons by the state to do his job according to the law and service regulations steps outside the bounds of the law and service regulations and comes to the centre of Belgrade, fully armed, with political demands, what is it if it isn’t an armed insurrection?”

On behalf of the JSO, the demands were made public by a person falsely identifying himself as ‘Major Batić’, later identified as Vladimir Potić, a sergeant in the Yugoslav Army transferred to the Ministry of the Interior from the Army’s Guards Brigade (according to a statement of Goran Petrović, the then RDB head, to Glas Javnosti on 11th November 2001) (Appendix No. 1)


Testimonies of other witnesses in case No. 5/03 show that the threat to use force was very serious. This is particularly evident from the event itself, then 180 fully armed men blocked a section of the highway in central Belgrade with 24 ‘Hummer’ vehicles in which assault rifles were concealed. According to testimony in case No. 5/03 of cooperating witness Ljubiša Buha: “Legija even wanted to use helicopters. He had talked about having two Mi-24 armoured helicopters, I think he wanted to fly them above Belgrade, to create panic. It means that they were ready … to go directly against the Government, to take over the Government, because they knew there was no one to resist them.”

According to Dušan Mihajlović (trial hearing, case No., 15th March 2005): “…it was completely clear that if we wanted to avoid a further confrontation and misfortune in the country, a compromise had to be made … to avoid a new bloodshed hanging in the air … What was a priority for me was to maintain public law and order and to prevent a violent overthrow of the government, as people were beginning to talk that the Unit would come to Belgrade, take over the Government, kill everyone in the Government and install in power those who would pursue what they saw as a patriotic policy, in contrast to ours … We were also aware of reality, that at that moment the Serbian police had no other armed unit capable of putting up a fight with the ‘Red Berets’ [informal name for the JSO], of disarming them or of carrying out a decision of the minister or the RDB head to disband the JSO … The realistic threat of terrorism to which this country is exposed was also the main reason for me not to act on demands made to me, not only from outside the country, but also the democratic public in the country, and my colleagues – to disband the Unit.”

According to the then Deputy Prime Minister, Čedomir Jovanović (trial hearing, case No., 11th April 2005), the Government was receiving information about plans to take over Belgrade Airport and Serbian TV, and to enter the Serbian Government building by force.”

Goran Petrović, the then head of the RDB (trial hearing, case No., 18th May 2005) spoke about a meeting between held during the insurrection by Prime Minister Đinđić, General Lukić and Interior Minister Mihajlović, during which Đinđić asked the others: “If they start out from Kula now and come here to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, what will you do? The two of them shrugged their shoulders and said, more or less ‘Nothing, it’s not a good idea.’ Finally, Đinđić asked them: “If I go to the Government building, and they come and throw me out into the street, what will you do?” They stuck to their former view that it would not be a good idea to confront the police, the Gendarmerie, with the JSO. Then the Prime Minister got up and left… If the late prime minister asked his minister and head of police ‘What will you do if they come here to the ministry from Kula?’ and they replied ‘Nothing’, and then asked them “What about if they come to the Government and throw me out, what will you do?,’ and again they said ‘Nothing,’ then clearly there is a justified assumption that a coup d’etat is possible at any moment, that any criminal offence can go unpunished, let alone a putsch. So in such a situation it is very real and very possible.”

According to the testimony of cooperating witness Zoran Vukojević (, trial hearing, 13th April 2004): “When the Unit had gone out into the streets, almost half the Government fled for their lives. The entire country seemed to live in fear. You could not find a policeman who would be with the Government at that moment. So that they were completely impotent. They [insurgents] literally did whatever they liked. No one could do anything to them.”

Dušan Maričić, the JSO’s commander and one of the insurrection’s organisers, was quoted as saying by Svedok on 12th November 2001, while the insurrection was still in progress: “This cannot just end like this – either we all die, and that won’t be so easy, or they hand in their resignations.”


The insurrection began when the JSO’s command claimed that its personnel had been misused and tricked when they were sent to arrest two ICTY fugitives, the brothers Predrag and Nenad Banović, without being told that they were persons wanted by the Hague Tribunal, or that their arrests would end in their surrender to the ICTY.

Veselin Lečić, assistant commander for security of the JSO, heard on 10th November 2004 in case No. 5/03, explained the insurrection: “From the professional point of view, from my point of view, it is normal for such a unit, if it is an official unit, and belongs to the Ministry, to the RDB, that they cannot exist any task that it can refuse, that it may not comment on tasks it has been ordered to perform, the commander, the Command and the entire Unit, but if I look at it from a different angle, as a member of the Unit, not as assistant for the job I performed, it is a fact that it was I who said that those people had been tricked on that occasion.”

“It means that I have to look at a position from two ends. It means that a legal basis did not exist, we were not empowered to refuse to obey an order or to comment on a task, but one of the most sensitive issues was involved, an issue that hurt them, where they were personally, where they personally interpreted that they were threatened because of their lives and their pasts, the most sensitive question that exists and that was the only thing that existed, and nothing else. It was so. Looking at it from that angle, in a way the protest was justified, viewed from that angle, if I am not thinking as the assistant commander for security.”

This justification for the insurrection was supported by the then President of the FRY, Vojislav Koštunica, and his DSS.

However, this explanation for the insurrection was refuted convincingly by Zoran Mijatović, the then deputy head of the Security Service, at the trial on 28th December 2004 (, citing written evidence which exists in the Service’s centre in Belgrade: “What was in the public was in my view only a front, because the Unit was fully aware of the facts when they arrested the Banović brothers, I myself was informed by the departmental head two days later, because I did not take part in it, that one day before the arrests of the Banović brothers a meeting had been held in the Belgrade centre with the top officers of the Belgrade centre at which were present the Unit’s commander, Maričić ‘Gumar’, his assistant Zvezdan Jovanović and security officer Veselin Lečić, that they had been told on that occasion that the next day they would have to arrest the Banović brothers, they were told who the brothers were, why the JSO was told to arrest them, and so on and so forth. This means that the people heading the JSO knew exactly whom they were going to arrest, why they had to arrest them, and I suppose they transmitted that information to the Unit, and all of the rest was manipulation, because it is completely untrue that they did not know whom they were going to arrest. You can obtain information about that from the then head of the centre, deputy head of the Belgrade centre, even Goran Petrović, who directed the operation… It means that they certainly knew, you have written proof in the centre, ask the centre to provide it, it’s all on paper in black and white. So if they know everything and yet claim that the protest was staged because of an unlawful arrest of the Banović brothers, then it’s all a lie, all for show…“

Cooperating witness Zoran Vukojević (, trial hearing, 13th April 2004), said when asked about the false and the real motives for the armed insurrection: “Dušan and ‘Legija’ simply exploited the arrests of the Banović brothers. Then they used the Unit to mount an insurrection. At that time Simović and ‘Vlada’ [Vladimir Milisavljević] were in police detention, and ‘Kum’ [Mile Luković] was in Montenegro. They simply decided it would benefit them to overthrow the Government at that time. That is why they took the Unit out into the streets. Dušan demanded, and I was there at the time, that they go all the way. That they end the whole thing. But in my view the Government was not ready to face the Unit and simply did everything they demanded. So their motive was to depose the Government.”


The real motives of the suspects in this complaints, JSO members, and in particular the leader of the insurrection, suspect Ulemek, were (a) fear of being handed over to the ICTY, (b) fear of the JSO being disbanded, and (c) fear of the unveiling of their roles in the crime on the Ibarska magistrala highway [involving Vuk Drašković] in proceedings that were already ongoing at the time of the insurrection (as well as in other murders, kidnappings and terrorist actions).

In case No., witnesses Zoran Mijatović and Čedomir Jovanović spoke about the motives:

  • “I will present only the facts. On 19th October 2001, Carla del Ponte … sent a long three- or four-page letter to Dušan Mihajlović … asking him for extensive dsocumentation on the JSO … where among other things she asked for data on Zvezdan Jovanović and Milorad Ulemek. Milorad was mentioned using three or four different names and aliases, but it all related to him. This means that there really was a letter on 19th October 2001, a little less than one month before the insurrection of the JSO. Who could have known that members of the Unit were being sought, that data on their activities were being asked for, it says there activities in Croatia, in Bosnia, then in Kosovo … I really don’t know…” (Testimony of witness Zoran Mijatović in case No., trial hearing, 28the December 2004).
  • “The JSO’s insurrection was linked to a crackdown on people who were fighting against organised crime.” … “The two resignations [of minister Mihajlović and RDB head Petrović] were demanded … because of their roles linked to shedding light on past crimes, crimes inherited from the era of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and crimes to which the Prime Minister especially pointed in his address to the parliament, when he presented Government policy. On that occasion Đinđić said that Serbia would never be a normal society without clear answers to the tragic questions of the
    disappearance of Ivan Stambolić, the tragedy of Slavko Ćuruvija, and of course the assassination attempt in Budva and the Ibarska magistrala assassinations.”(Testimony of witness Čedomir Jovanović in case No., trial hearing, 11th April 2005).
  • “As for the insurrection of the JSO, it is in fact the last stage of a conflict begun at a moment when it had become clear that as the new government we were not ready to face in the way expected of us the demands that would completely change the character of the society we wanted to create in Serbia. Therefore, the distance created between the JSO or the number-one man of the JSO, Milorad Ulemek, is several months long. It escalated at the time of the fights started by Ulemek in ‘Stupica’, a club in Belgrade [15th June 2001] and previously in a discotheque in Kula [4th May 2001], after which he had been suspended from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” (Testimony of witness Čedomir Jovanović in case No., trial hearing, 11th April 2005).


Following the success of the insurrection and the replacement of the RDB’s head, Goran Petrović, and his deputy, Zoran Mijatović, Prime Minister Đinđić was forced to appoint to their positions Andrija Savić and Milorad Bracanović, the former head of the JSO’s security.

In a broadcast on TV B92 named ‘Insider: Manuscripts Do Not Burn’ aired on 22nd November 2004, Vladimir Nikolić, a former RDB officer, described the consequences of the replacement: “Why was it fatal? For the simple reason that Milorad Bracanović was the man who in the worst period of the Service that we talked about, from 1998 until 5th October 2000, was the security head of the JSO and the closest aide of Milorad ‘Legija’ Luković [Ulemek]. By appointing Milorad Bracanović as the deputy director of the Service, it is my deepest conviction that ‘Legija’ effectively became the director of the Service. Mr. Andrija Savić, who was appointed by the Government de iure, was simply a front for the activities of the tandem Bracanović-Ulemek.”

On 18th July 2005, the Special Department of the District Court in Belgrade found Milorad Bracanović guilty of the criminal offences of failing to report preparations for the murder of the former president of the presidency of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić, and the attempted murder of the president of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Vuk Drašković, committed by JSO officers during the Milošević regime, while Bracanović was serving as the JSO’s head of security.

Cooperating witness Zoran Vukojević, in case No., asked by the presiding judge at the trial on 13th April 2004 what they [the JSO and the ‘Zemun Clan’] had gained by the appointment of Milorad Bracanović as the deputy director of the BIA [Security-Information Service], said: “He was the de facto number-one man there. They gained total control of the Service.”

Witness Zoran Janjušević, a member of the State Security Council of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, (Council formed after the JSO’s armed insurrection) and an adviser to Prime Minister Đinđić, in case No., at the trial on 14th March 2005 described his relations with Milorad Bracanović in the following manner: “I had contacts with Mr. Savić from time to time, but more often with Mr. Bracanović, because he frequently summoned us to his office … until I realised that he was lying about things and making a fool of me, as he obviously thought I was completely illiterate about things. After I had realised that he was lying and that what he was saying was not true, I decided to stop going to his office … many of the things he had tried to tell me did not conform to the truth … Public Security [police] had different data, and that was when I saw things were not right.” Asked by the legal representative of the aggrieved party at the same hearing whether witness Janjušević had any opinions about the reasons for Bracanović’s lies, Janjušević replied: “Well, I was the person who transmitted information to the prime minister. The prime minister did not tell me why he did not believe Bracanović, but I know that he had told his secretary not to accept calls from Mr. Bracanović on the special phone line.”

Colonel Ro­do­ljub Mi­lo­vić, the then head of the Criminal Police Department of Belgrade local police, testifying about his contacts with Milorad Bracanović at the trial hearing in the aforementioned case on 27th December 2004, described the contacts in a similar manner: “Documentation we [police] received [from the BIA] in some form of typed text on paper was inaccurate in many aspects. It did not indicate the actual situation. For that reason we insisted, in case a more serious action had to be mounted against that group, on having some technology allowing us to listen in on some conversations and reach our own conclusions, instead of having someone bombarding us with such conclusions in written form, et cetera. At the time there were major disagreements between ordinary police and colleagues in the State Security [BIA]. Many people even said they knew what was happening in respect of those measures … we did not trust the State Security at the time, we knew someone was passing data on to Dušan Spasojević.”


Insurrection is a criminal offence of posing a threat, whose consequence is a state of danger for the protective object of the constitutional order and security. A state of danger also means an enhanced possibility of further violations of the constitutional order and security. Therefore, when violations do occur, legal theory speaks about the intermediate consequences of the offence of threatening. (Bayer)

The armed insurrection created a state of danger (the Security Service flouted the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Government) in which it became easier, as ultimately happened, to commit violations – the assassination of the republican Prime Minister, by officers of the Security Service. This is also the view assumed in the indictment for the murder of the Prime Minister filed by the prosecution under No. KTs 2/03 dated 21st August 2003, which on page 32 notes: “… the achievements of the insurrection encouraged Spasojević and ‘Legija’ [Ulemek] to step up efforts to realise their main idea – to assume power, but in another way and using different means.

The indictment goes on to say:

The activities were planned for a longer term and respected strict rules of internal discipline, where in the hierarchy the position of every member of this gang was known precisely. At the top of the pyramid stood indictees Luković-‘Legija’ and Dušan Spasojević, who in their capacity as organisers had unlimited power, both in respect of planning the organisation’s activities, and in respect of issuing direct and concrete orders to individual members of the organisation. The entire organisation was conceived so that after acquiring financial and other social potency, with the support of the JSO, then headed by ‘Legija’, and using the positions the gang would win in certain social, political, judicial and other factors, it would turn towards gaining outright power. This initially called for injecting instability into the existing government, the elimination of certain persons as the holders of power, changes of the personal structure in essential segments of government, all in all enabling the organisation to gain total power. In the entire idea the fact that the there existed indictments raised against certain people by the ICTY was exploited to expand the front of the organisation and gain the support of more people who had a negative attitude to the existence of the Hague Tribunal.

Given that power could not be won by legal means, especially not by the Spasojević-Luković criminal organisation, they came up with the idea of realising the plan with the help of the JSO, in its capacity as a well-trained armed formation with full obedience to Luković –‘Legija’.

Realisation of the plan could only take place by weakening the government by assassinating the prime minister, as well as other high-ranking federal and republican officials. This would create a feeling of a lack of security and fertile ground to mount an ultimate action of the JSO to gain power. The JSO’s insurrection was the first ‘test’ of those ambitions, which also had its political aspect in its demands for the replacements of the minister of police and other officials. The action had limited gains, because only a few personnel changes in the Interior Ministry were achieved, but even those achievements encouraged Spasojević and ‘Legija’ to work towards their basic idea – gaining power – in other ways and using other means. Their first obstacle was the prime minister, the late Zoran Đinđić, whom they could not influence in any manner, or even have contacts with.

Given that the realisation of that idea required a bigger number of participants, Spasojević and ‘Legija’ organised a conspiracy using the existing loyal members of the criminal association and well-tested JSO members. In that way the participants in the conspiracy, whose basic aim was threatening the constitutional security of the FRY, became defendants listed in the indictment under I.1. The further realisation of the plan called for both the existence of a plan of action and the distribution of tasks among the members, in which context in the organisation of Colonel Spasojević and Luković – ‘Legija’ concrete activities were undertaken as described in detail in the operative part of this indictment. After those activities were completed, they organised the concrete realisation of the plan – the assassination of the late Zoran Đinđić.”

By the success of the insurrection, the Government of Zoran Đinđić, as we showed earlier, lost effective control of the Security Service (RDB), leading to a permanent state of threat to the security of the country. However, as will become evident later in this criminal complaint, this does not mean that the RDB now became completely uncontrolled. Control of the Service, after the armed insurrection, was assumed by the political opponents of Zoran Đinđić and hid Government – the Military Security Service and its then supreme commander, Vojislav Koštunica.

This was best proved by Rade Bulatović, then Assistant for National Security to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Koštunica, who wrote in an article entitled ‘The Victory of Patriotism’ published in the weekly NIN on 28th March 2002: “The Security Department of the Army of Yugoslavia (popularly known as ‘KOS’) performs state security activities in the Army of Yugoslavia as the RDB does in the civilian sector … There is no antagonism nowadays between the KOS and the RDB of Serbia. All [former] disagreements were surmounted by the change at the helm, and positive progress was achieved in particular by the appointment of Mr. Andrija Savić, whose arrival begins the process of depoliticalising the RDB … I can freely say that the severance of the Perišić affair was a success for the united security system of the country, irrespective of the fact that the military security was the chief executor of the action. This action will be featured in future security textbooks. I believe it to be a success for the Yugoslav service with its modest technical capacities – but with a high degree of patriotism expressed. I am sure that it left a positive impression on the broadest public.” (Appendix No. 2)

Although in an indirect way, the advisor of Vojislav Koštunica says clearly that the appointment of new people, Savić and Bracanović, eliminated any existing “antagonism between the KOS and the RDB of Serbia”, or, in other words, that the RDB had been placed under the control of the Security Department of the Army of Yugoslavia, which was from early in July 2001 head by suspect in this complaint Aco Tomić, characterised by a “high degree of patriotism expressed”, in his capacity as head of the Security Department of the Army General Staff.

“It should be recalled here that the replacement of the number-one man of the military security service, General Đaković, took place on the day of extradition of Slobodan Milošević to the ICTY. Due to what was called at the time the failure, or lack of capability, of the army to prevent the extradition, Gen. Đaković was replaced unlawfully by General Tomić,” witness Čedomir Jovanović testified at the trial hearing on 11th April 2005. [“Ten days before he become the head of the Security Department, General Tomić had been ordered by the Chief of the Army General Staff, Nebojša Pavković, to attend appropriate training courses, as he did not have the requisite qualifications for the post to which he had been appointed.” Source: B92/News,19th June 2002].

Suspect Vojislav Koštunica

Although suspect Vojislav Koštunica had to have known – not only from the daily security reports supplied to the president of the republic, but even from the news media, who had for days reported extensively and with much concern on the matter – that an armed insurrection was in progress in the country, suspect Vojislav Koštunica explicitly claimed at a news conference that the armed insurrection “did not threaten the security of the country”:

“What is concerned are people who I believe did not threaten the security of the country in any way, except maybe in respect of the flow of traffic. The job they are doing is what it is, and one of them [suspect Ulemek], did say that they had no other uniforms than those they have. They appeared in what is their fatigue-dress and every-day clothing. I believe that if things had been resolved earlier, none of this would have happened.” (Tanjug, 15th November 2001) (Appendix No. 3)

Public support for the insurrection of the JSO also came from their former commander, suspect Milorad Ulemek: “The very unfair both conduct and attitude of the Ministry of Internal Affairs towards the JSO, especially when we know that for all these years the Unit had blindly executed tasks it had been given, and in my view a revolt of this kind is completely justified and normal. For example, when doctors stage a protest, they go out in their white smocks, when miners protest, they do so in their miners’ overalls, and when JSO members protest, they go out in their equipment and in their vehicles. I did not see a single aggressive act they aimed at anyone. Therefore, I think that it is completely proper and that it is their way to express themselves” (source: B92, Info, Vesti, 22nd March 2003) (Appendix No. 4)

In an interview with Vojislav Koštunica aired on TV B92 on 27th March 2003, asked by B92 about the bizarre identification of doctors with JSO members, and an armed insurrection with a strike: “Did you quote ‘Legija’, or did he quote your words?”, suspect Koštunica answered: “I did not quote anyone, they were my own words. Whether anyone said so before me or after me really does not matter”.

If it is odd that in his capacity as the president of the republic suspect Koštunica quotes the leader of an armed insurrection, it is even more odd that he treats the armed insurrection as any other strike, borrowing the argumentation of suspect Ulemek. Ulemek may not have been aware of the following, but as a man holding a PhD in legal sciences, suspect Koštunica must have known that under Article 57 paragraph 3 of the then Constitution of the FRY police personnel were barred from going on strike.

This is all the more important if we take into account the fact that on the very day the armed insurrection was breaking out, when the JSO presented its demand for the adoption of a law on the Hague, in a statement to the Tanjug News Agency suspect Vojislav Koštunica expressed a demand identical to that made by the JSO: “The President of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Koštunica, stressed that a ‘legal framework’ for co-operation with the Hague Tribunal was ‘absolutely necessary’ and that ‘We simply cannot exist without it. It is also simply the only way to protect ourselves as a state and to assist our nationals who find themselves on any of the Hague’s lists” (Tanjug, 11th November 2001). Once again, it remains unclear who quoted whom here.

When suspect Vojislav Koštunica’s own Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) repeats the same untrue claims of the JSO that the only reason for the insurrection had been the alleged trick played on them to arrest the Banović brothers, then it is clear that what is taking place here cannot be just an accidental identity of views, because in effect they all spoke with one and the same voice.

By finding justification for a serious criminal offence against security and the constitutional order, the DSS and Koštunica certainly emboldened the insurgents.

But suspect Vojislav Koštunica provided far more serious and decisive assistance to the armed insurrection of the JSO when in his capacity as the President of the FRY he failed to carry out his constitutional obligation (offence of omission to act) from Article 135 paragraph 1 in connection with Article 133 paragraph 1 of the then Constitution of the FRY (Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 1/92) under which as the commander of the Armed Forces it was his duty to take all the necessary steps to suppress the insurrection and protect the constitutional order, even if it meant the use of force. Probably the mere appearance of Army units on the scene would have been enough to halt the insurrection.

This is confirmed by the leader of the insurrection, suspect Ulemek. In testimony given in case No., Ulemek said that during the insurrection he was “worried that the military might interfere” (trial hearing, 4th June 2004) and that “If the Army … had shown up in any form, we would automatically have withdrawn” (trial hearing, 13th July 2004).

At a trial hearing in case No. on 18th May 2005, the then RDB head, Goran Petrović, testified about intercepted conversations between JSO personnel and Ljubiša Buha and Dušan Spasojević during the insurrection: “In one of the conversations which I have made public, one of the JSO men, I guess ‘Gumar’, or someone else, talked to either ‘Čume’ or Spasojević, who told him, literally: “There can be no stopping now, until Koštunica says so”.

Consequently, it is clear not just that suspect Koštunica had had a legal obligation to deploy the Army in the defence of the constitutional order from the armed insurrection, but that if that had happened, according to the words of the participants in the insurrection, the mere appearance of the Army would have been sufficient and that the insurrection would have been halted immediately. The insurgents themselves confirm that they had seen the only obstruction to the achievement of their objectives in the hands of suspect Koštunica and possible deployment of the Army.

When instead of doing so, suspect Koštunica by making his now famous statement about ‘white smocks’ actively supported the insurrection and the political demands made by the insurgents, it represented a wilful act of assisting the attack on the constitutional order, which had far-reaching consequences which culminated in the assassination of the prime minister and changes in the government.

Asked by the legal representative of the aggrieved party in case No. if after the interception of the conversation in which the insurgents say that “only Koštunica can stop this” there had been any idea of the Government or Prime Minister Đinđić talking to the then President of the FRY, Koštunica, and asking him to stop the insurrection, witness Goran Petrović said: “It was clear to everyone that during 2001 … a polarisation had taken place on the political scene … In just a few words, Koštunica and DSS not only failed to do anything at all, but in fact actively blocked all efforts of Đinđić and the Government of Serbia.” He added: “Such an appeal would have been counter-productive … the two sides were directly confronted.”

At a trial hearing in case No. on 15th March 2005, witness Dušan Mihajlović gave a similar assessment of the political background of the insurrection: “Consequently, I realised that things had run out of control, that behind our backs someone had prepared an insurrection by an elite unit in the service of the State Security, and that things were serious.”

Witness Goran Petrović (, trial hearing, 18th May 2005) was even more direct: “Due to the disgraceful conduct of Vojislav Koštunica and the DSS and the support they lent to the insurrection of the JSO, due to the support, not public support but covert support, of certain DOS leaders and Government ministers, due to the support of the Army, certain media, independent intellectuals and I don’t know who else, the insurrection was successful.”

The attitude and conduct of suspect Koštunica in relation to the armed insurrection is by far the most important reason for the success of the armed insurrection.


Besides similarities between those who participated in the armed insurrection on the one hand, and suspect Vojislav Koštunica and his DSS on the other, in respect of attitudes to co-operation with the ICTY, the extradition of Slobodan Milošević (suspect Ulemek: “a disgraceful act”; suspect Koštunica: “a limited coup d’etat”), the replacement of minister Mihajlović and general hostility towards what was described as Đinđić’s ‘traitorous government’, there was a long series of concrete actions and synchronised and harmonised activities limited not just to the armed insurrection and support for that insurrection, but taking place during a long and unbroken period of time – before the insurrection, during the insurrection, and after the insurrection, throughout the period, until the issuance of the verdict in the trial of those charged with the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić.

(1) In his testimony during the trial of the assassins of the Prime Minister (K.p br.5/03), witness Vladimir Popović said on 16th May 2005: “Two months after 5th October [2000], Gradimir Nalić, in his capacity as an envoy of Vojislav Koštunica, visited the Unit in the presence of Rade Marković. He, Rade Marković, Branko Crni and the entire team. He was introduced to the Unit as the future minister of police, and he made a patriotic speech to them, urging them to turn towards Koštunica, to side with Koštunica, that if they sided with Koštunica, there would be no Hague.”

(2) When in November 2000 a report appeared in the public about surveillance carried out on the late journalist Slavko Ćuruvija, the RDB’s complicity in that case became unambiguous. This raised the question of the replacement of Radomir Marković, the then head of the RDB. Zoran Đinđič threatened to leave the then transitional government: “Marković must go, and there can be no compromises there. [His continued presence] tarnishes the reputation of the system, confidence in institutions, it harms the system, the state and government.” (Politika, 4th November 2000). On the very next day, suspect Vojislav Koštunica responded: “Precipitant prosecution of high-ranking people in the police and the armed forces is without a doubt contrary to state interests.” (Politika, 5th November 2000). It was only on 25th January 2001 that Radomir Marković submitted his resignation, not to the Government of Serbia, but to the President of the FRY, the suspect in this complaint, Vojislav Koštunica, who was not competent to receive it. In his resignation Marković made clear that he had “made an agreement” with suspect Koštunica to remain on his post: “I submit my resignation in accordance with the promise I gave to the President of the FRY, Vojislav Koštunica, and in accordance with the agreement we reached on that occasion: that I remain at my post until the election of a new Government of the Republic of Serbia”. (Appendix No. 5)

True to form, RDB head Radomir Marković used his survival to conduct an unlawful action of destroying RDB documentation. On 6th October 2000, Marković sent to all the local RDB centre heads communication No. 3210, in which he among other things ordered the following: “It is necessary to conduct selective inspection of documentation, and to realise its preservation, or the destruction of unnecessary documentation, pursuant to regulations”. He added that “… the safeguarding and storage of documentation must be organised so that it is rendered completely inaccessible to unauthorised persons in all cases”, which represented preparation for the unlawful action of destroying documentation which took place subsequently.

According to a report dated 15th March 2001 of the local Belgrade Centre of the RDB, drafted at the instructions of deputy RDB head Zoran Mijatović, RDB centres acted on Marković’s order, which led to:

“- the destruction of materials about gross abuses and unlawful conduct, i.e., failure to abide by the provisions of the Regulation on Reporting, Keeping Personal Records and Documentation in the State Security Service, and the Instructions on the Procedure of Destroying Documentation in the RDB”; and

– systematic destruction of RDB documentation and the erasure of all traces of those types of documents which indicated unlawful conduct and abuses in the work of the State Security (which certainly include politically-motivated murders committed by both JSO members and “Zemun Clan’ members), with the aim of protecting the then leadership of the RDB and those from whom they received orders, given that what was concerned was documentation relating to the applications of means and methods, measures and actions by the RDB against the political adversaries of the government then in power.” (Appendix No. 6)

It is certain that this also led to the destruction of documentation about numerous abuses and unlawful conduct of the JSO. One can only guess how grateful the JSO was to suspect Vojislav Koštunica.

(3) On the same date when, during the armed insurrection, the JSO made its political demand for the adoption of a law on co-operation with the Hague Tribunal, an identical demand was made by suspect Vojislav Koštunica. (Appendix No. 7)

(4) Suspect Aco Tomić, whom Koštunica had unlawfully appointed the head of the Military Security Department, allayed and convinced suspect Milorad Ulemek and Dušan Spasojević that the Army would not interfere in the armed insurrection of the JSO. (Appendix No. 8)

(5) In his interview in the weekly Vreme no. 648 of 5. June 200, suspect Vojislav Koštunica tried to justify the meeting between the head of BIA Rade Bulatović and suspect Aco Tomić with suspect Ulemekom i Dušan Spasojević during the armed insurrection by explaining „that Rade Bulatović was without any intent participant in a talk between the Security Department, General Aco Tomić, again professionally and officially, and a number of people who asked to be received by him. Head of Security Department cannot chose who he can talk to“ (Appendix No. 9)

Such explanation is of course absurd because all meetings with the head of the Department must be announced and nobody can „unintentionally“ attend any meetings of the head of Security Department. Also, at the time of the meeting between suspect Tomić and suspect Ulemek, the latter was, for months, no longer the Commander of JSO, nor an active member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which he ceased to be on 20 June 2001., after the known incidents which he caused in Kula and in a club called „Stupica“ in Belgrade. Therefore, suspect Tomić had no ’official or professional’ reason to meet, not to mention any reasons that would justify his meeting with the notorious drug dealer Dušan Spasojević from whom he even received a mobile phone as a gift.

(6) It has been already noted that the former head of RDB, Goran Petrović, in his testimony in the case, at the trial of assassins of Prime Minister Đinđić, mentioned operative information, intercepted conversations which show that the participants in the armed insurrection only trusted suspect Vojislav Koštunica. The weekly Vreme No.. 637, of 20th March 2003, published a transcript of a telephone conversation on 11th November, at 21:50 h between Dušan Spasojević and an identified man (named NM): „Duća called NM and said that his Prime Minister went to Kula.

Duća: “Call him and tell him to tell the other one, and tell him that there is no way that they we will give in, they cannot betray us now. That is to say, no chance, we will not come around, they will blow him off, who bows down is a sissy. They have to have their demands fulfilled. No way, except for Koštunica, if he issues an order.” NM: “Order for them to stop? He will never do that.” Duća: “And, tomorrow they are probably coming to Belgrade. No chance that they will give up, until this one is out of the picture. Tell him so he will know, so Koštunica will know. Tell him that that he went there. But do not use that telephone” (Appendix No. 10)

Here one can see that (a) that suspect Koštunica was informed about the insurrection (b) that, according to the words of the protestors, he could have ordered its discontinuation, which he failed to do.

(7) Asked by the journalists, during the insurrection, whether this was an armed insurrection, since armed men blocked a part of the city, suspect

Vojislav Koštunica, the then President of FRY, gave the famous statement:

“You see, in my view, other than blocking traffic, they have not threatened the security of this country. They are just doing their job, and one of them said that they do not have other uniforms. They are wearing their every-day working clothes. If things had been resolved earlier, this would not have happened.”

Suspect Koštunica repeated the words uttered by suspect Ulemek in his public support to the rebels…. „ I think that a revolt of this kind is justified and normal. When doctors are protesting they wear their white smocks … when members of JSO are protesting in their uniforms and equipment and their vehicles … I think it is acceptable and that it represents their way of expression”. (Appendix No. 4)

(8) Zoran Šami, high official of the Democratic Party of Serbia joint suspect Kostunica in his support to the insurrection of the Special Operations Unit. He stated that the members of the Unit were hurt because of the way in which they were used for the arrest of brothers Banovic and thus repeated the false reason for the insurrection given by the command of the Unit and that the protest would not have happened if the relations with the ICTY were regulated by law. In this way he supported the demand of the protestors that such law is adopted, and thirdly that „he received information about the protest from the media and that DSS had nothing to do with it“. (Appendix No. 11) (Appendix No. 12)

His insisting on the fact that DSS „had nothing to do with the protest“and that he found out about it from the media is strange and superfluous. Obviously such statement is false.

According to the official report of the head of State security service in Zajecar, Ilija Matic, of 13th November 2001, Šami, Vice-president of DSS „ met a number of times with Legija“ and that according to his source „the Democratic Party of Serbia was openly supporting the Red Berets, that „most of the threats are directed towards Dusan Mihajlovic and that they are doing all in their power to remove him“ and that „the Berets are well aware that the Army will not interfere“. A copy of this report is published in Mihajlovic’s book Povlen fogs and Views, and can certainly be found in the archives of BIA. (Appendix No. 11) (Appendix No. 13)

(9) Rade Bulatović, advisor for national security of the President of FRY Koštunica, said in his article published in NIN „Victory of Patriotism“ (Appendix No. 2, already quoted) supported the nomination of Andrija Savić and Milorad Bracanović as leaders of the civilian Security service. This change in the leadership of the Security service was a direct result of the armed protest; the goals of the Unit during the protest were the same as the wishes of the DSS; they wanted the government to lose control of the security service and to put it under the control of the Military security service, i.e. as Bulatovic said “to eliminate antagonism between the Military and the Republican security services in Serbia“.

(10) According to the Judgment of the District Court in Belgrade, Department for Organised Crime Kp.bro.3/04 (the so-called „the Zemun Clan trial“ of 18th January 2008, „ on 28th February 2002, around 23.55h Dušan Krsmanović, Juričić, Pović and Milisavljevic, upon the order of Dušan Spasojević….. threw two defensive bombs on the premises of DSS in Braće Jugovića Street No.2 (page 41).

It was also established (pages 130 and 929 of the Judgment) that Dušan Spasojević said that Zoran Đinđić ordered that the bombs be thrown on the premises of DSS. (Appendix No. 14)

In his testimony given to the Special Court, Gradimir Nalić, legal representative of DSS, used this false information given by Dušan Spasojević and said: „the attack on DSS happened when serious disagreements existed between the DSS and DS … In our party we understood the attack as an act of violence against us, but we did not resort to revenge“(Appendix No.15)

Politika daily of 1st February 2003, in an article entitled „the question of DSS: Protected witness or Repentant“quotes the statetment of DSS: “DSS pointed out a number of times to the partnership between the government and orgnized crime, especially with the „Surčin group“. We were asked to produce evidence (for claiming that there is coexistence between the mafia and politics), as if…. the bomb attack on the headquarters of DSS is not a sufficient proof for the existence of such a tandem“. (Appendix No.16)

(11) In the beginning of September 2002, newspapers Nacional and Identitet (during the police Sablja action it was established that Identitet was financed by Dušan Spasojević and suspect Ulemek) published a series of letters by Ljiljana Buha who was, at the time, kept in Dušan Spasojević’s private prison. The letters contained accusations against Prime Minister Đinđić and his associates (Dragoljub Mićunović, Čedomir Jovanović, Goran Vesić, Dragoljub Marković), about their alleged partnerships with organized crime. They went to such lengths to call them „Camarilla“and to accuse them of planning assassination of President Koštunica (Appendix No.17). The Cabinet of the then President of FRY forwarded the said letters to the Republican Prosecutors Office and proposed investigation.

In her testimony in the case „The Zemun Clan“ (District Court in Belgrade, Special Department for organized crime, Judgment Kp. br.3/04 of 18th January 2008) said : „Dušan Spasojević and Mile Luković would bring ready letters and dictated them to me and then I would sign the letters which they would take to I do not know who“.

Since Dušan Spasojević and Mile Luković were killed during the police action Sablja, it was never determined where the „ready made letters” came from.

This went on throughout September 2002 in the midst of the Presidential election campaign. The elections took place between 29th September and 13th October 2002. Other Serbian newspapers took over statements and claims published in Nacional and Identitet

(12) During his Presidential campaign, suspect Koštunica used to a great extent the contents of the letters dictated by Dušan Spasojević.

In a TV duel with Miroljub Labus, held in the Media Centre on 9th October 2002, suspect Koštunica says to Labus: „There is something incredible, and you must know this since it has to do with the interesting and unusual ties and arrangements Prime Minister Djindjic has with some eminent businessmen. That is something, be it the case of Surčin or any other deal, which would, in any other country, cause great concern. Thank God that after a whole year the media started dealing with this. Just give some thought to this fact. “

When Miroljub Labus said that what Koštunica stated constitutes defamation, a criminal offence, suspect Koštunica replied:” This is not a defamation or slander. I just said what the media are writing about, and they are writing a lot, and no one is reacting, and that is all there is. Are they writing or not? Yes they are. Simply, there are some interesting ties. (Appendix No.18).

Suspect Koštunica stated the same accusations about „ obvious ties between the mafia and one part of the ruling coalition “ based on Spasojevic’s letter in his statements given to Fonet and Radio Deutche Welle (Blic, 7th September 2002), at a convention in Vršac (Večernje Novosti, 21st September 2002) and at a convention in Niš, when he said that there exists “a secret relationship between the mafia, the criminals and the government ” (Glas, 22nd September 2002).

There is reasonable doubt that suspect Koštunica knew the circumstances under which Ljiljana Buha’s letters were composed, i.e. that Dušan Spasojevič dictated the letters to her. This has become obvious from the indictment KTs. br…2/03 of the Prosecution of 21st August 2003, which on its 12th page, based on evidence produced during investigation states that in the course of 2002, at a meeting of suspect Aco Tomić with Spasojević and suspect Ulemek, suspect Tomić suggested to Spasojević and Ulemek „to move Ljiljana Buha, who was kept in New Belgrade, to a safer place.“ There is no doubt that if suspect Tomić knew this, his commander Koštunica must have know about this as well.

This suspicion still stands, in spite of the fact that the Special Prosecutor said that this information is not a sufficient evidence to prove that Aco Tomić was a participant in the assassination.

(13) On 28th January 2003, a great number of newspapers published suspect Milorad Ulemek’s „Open letter“ where he states a number of accusations and threats directed to the Government of Serbia: „ they are counting down our days, playing with our destinies, and the destiny of the whole nation … they do not respect neither former nor present commanders… they will not let me be who I am… but they want me to be who I am not… they are claiming that I did what I did not do… they are smearing sincere patriots… they do not need the people or anyone else… they are throwing away the last credits of the people’s will…they are stomping on national pride and dignity… nothing is sacred to them and they do not care for anything that is Serbian… they are insulting their own state… they are deceiving us … they are doing what they should not be doing…“ and finally: „no one will forgive you“. (Appendix No.19)

(14) Asked to comment the threats by suspect Ulemek, high official of DSS, Dragan Jočić replied: „ in Ulemek’s letter … he does not see… a call to rebellion or to the use of arms, that „Legija’s letter is serious“ that it is “ a political analysis of the work of the Government and of everything that took place since 5th October to date“, that „any citizen of Serbia could have written such a letter“, that „the letter is a criticism of the present political moment“ that it „represents a threat for someone who is not doing his job well and is leading the Government (i.e. late Zoran Đinđić), „but that it is not a threat by Legija, but by the people“

In other words, Jočić agreed with the threats of suspect Ulemek, except that he interpreted such threats as the voice of the people. (Appendix No. 20)

(15) Immediately after Milorad Ulemek and Zvezdan Jovanović assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić, suspect Vojislav Koštunica, who was not holding any state office at the time, calls for the formation of the so-called concentration government which would include representatives of the parties that were part of Slobodan Milošević regime, the Socialist Party of Serbia, and the Serbian Radical Party and whose mandatory (Prime Minister) would be suspect Vojislav Koštunica, since, at the time, his party was the strongest opposition party in the country. (Appendix No. 21)

(16) Suspect Vojislav Koštunica and his party DSS criticized the introduction of the state of emergency after the assassination, owing to which most of the assassinators were found and arrested: „Western countries consider that the state of emergency is the only way to eradicate organized crime, but they did not consider if such a measure is adequate. I do not think that this is the best way. “– from an interview to B92 on 27th March 2003. (Appendix No.22)

(17) When the incitement against the assassinators came into force, suspect Vojislav Koštunica and high DSS officials went to great lengths to obstruct the court proceedings.

Zoran Stojković, the then Minister of Justice, called for the abolishment of the Special court (Appendix No. 23), DSS official and Minister of Internal Affairs, Dragan Jočić proposed that the proceedings be returned to the investigative stage (Appendix No.24), Gradimir Nalić, claimed that „the court proceedings were staged by people who actually killed Đinđić“ (Appendix No. 25). The former Secretary of the Government (cabinet) Vojislav Koštunica, Dejan Mihajlov, claimed that Živković and Tadić know who the „real assassins are“and that they are covering for them (Appendix No. 26) (Appendix No. 27), Miroslav Milošević states that the indictment is „on shaky grounds“ (Appendix No.28), and suspect Vojislav Koštunica states that the authorities are not satisfied with the work of the Special prosecutor Jovan Prijić, who then was replaced. (Appendix No. 29)

Suspect Koštunica went further by making a cynical statement in an interview to the weekly Vreme no. 648 of 5th June 2003, that „… if people belonging to the Red Berets were involved in the assassination of Zoran Đinđić, then the government should be held responsible because, as public servants, they must have organized the armed protest against the government, and then killed the Prime Minister. (Appendix No. 9).

Maja Kovačević stated in the B92, program “Insajder: Political background of the assassination”, on 13th March 2008: “When action Svedok (witness) was about to be completed, and whose purpose was to crackdown mafia, representatives of the Democratic Party of Serbia stated that it is impermissible for Ljubiša Buha to get the status of a cooperating witness. That is, according to DSS, yet another affair, whose purpose is to exempt from liability Zoran Đinđić and his associates for their ties with the leadership of organized crime in the country. “

“The publishing of various information against judges and prosecutors in the media started when the then Minister of Justice said that the Special court should be abolished… that cooperating witnesses will lose their status, probably to make them change their minds, I do not know who stood behind this or why. Then there were different articles, I will show you the articles, here: We do not need the Special court; The Special court will be abolished; Leaders of the Special Court are interrogated in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; again Abolishment of the Special Court Announced; Who will be the Judge to the Court; here, The Trial-a Legal Freak; Judges Afraid of Judgment. Let me remind you that the Special court adopted over 30 judgments, of which two thirds are enforceable. Here: Djura Mutavi, who is cooperating witness Suvajdžić, will be put on the stand as the accused, – this is text from 2004. Dušan Krsmanović is in a Private Prison of Marko Kljajević, one more article Marko Kljajević, member of the Zemun Clan; Investigation against Marko Kljajević- because of his ties with the Surčin-Zemun Clans; Attorneys taking the role of Judges. These are some of the titles from the media like: Judge Threatened Because of Maka’s Group; Witnesses Frightened at the Trial of Members of the Kruševo Group; Businessmen, Politicians and Judges on the List for Liquidation; Paid With his Life, this is related to the killing of a witness, and in the end we can see the consequences – Kljajević Abandons the Trial of the Century, said Maja Kovačevič for the Insajder. (Appendix No.30)

(18) On 2nd May 2004, a little before 9.p.m. suspect Ulemek, then principal defendant and the first accused for the assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić, turned himself in to the members of the Gendarmerie who were present in front of his house in Ilija Stojadinović street no.2 (Danas 4th May 2004). Members of the Gendarmerie called the Commander of the Belgrade detachment who called General Goran Radosavljević – Guri, who joined the Gendarmerie on the spot. According to Radosavljević, one of the members said that „Legija is there and that he wants to surrender. I asked to talk to him on the phone … I recognized his voice. „Then I order red the Commander of the Belgrade Detachment to go and get him. I called Minister of police Dragan Jočić … and he said that he will call back in five minutes and that I should turn Legija to the judicial authorities. Five minutes later Jočić called me… he said that I am to take him to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, to the office of the chief of the Republican Public Security Milošević and to wait for him there.“ When Radosavljević came to Milošević’s cabinet, he [Ulemek] was sitting in the office of Miroslav Milošević talking to him. Then Minister Jočić and Rade Bulatović, Chief of BIA came. At one point, Jočić asked me and Milošević to leave the room. I do not what happened next. “ (Appendix No. 31)

According to the daily Danas of 21st -22nd May 2005, „Miroslav Milošević said yesterday … that the Minister of police Dragan Jočić and Director of BIA Rade Bulatović talked with Ulemek. General Radosavljević said in „Kažiprst“ program of Radio B92 on 18th May 2005, that Minister Jočić asked to be left alone with Ulemek: „He asked me [Radosavljević and Milosević] to go and do our work which we did. (Appendix No. 32). Ulemek was not taken to Central prison before 2:30 a.m. the next day, i.e. 3rd. May 2004.

This meeting in the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia was unlawful and secret. The order by Dragan Jočić to take Ulemek to the office of the head of the Republican Public Security premises is in violation of the provisions of articles 566-569 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, according to which Ulemek should have been taken to the competent local organ of the internal affairs i.e. the Secretariat of Internal Affairs in 29th November street in Belgrade who published the wanted list where he would have been given the decision on detention and taken to remand prison of the District court i.e. the Central prison. Pursuant to Article 150, Para 4 of the Criminal Procedure Law no one has the right to talk without prior consent of the Presiding judge where the main trail is conducted.

Aware of the fact that his conduct was unlawful, Minister Jočić did not comment the talk. He gave his first statement on 3rd May 2004, claiming that „the legal procedure was precisely abided by“ (Appendix No. 33). This was the official statement of Minister Jočić about Ulemek’s surrender until one year later; Goran Radosaljević described what actually happened in the night between 2nd and 3rd May 2004, in the radio program Kažiprst on 18th May 2005. After that, Minister Jočić and other DSS members and the head of the Republican Public Security Milošević and Minister of Justice Zoran Stojković unsuccessfully tried to justify and explain the purpose of that meeting by giving statements such as:

– Jočić: that principal defendant was taken to the Ministry of Internal Affairs„because the Central Prison does not admit during night“ (Appendix No. 34)

– Jočić: he came back from Mount Zlatibor and met with Ulemek „in order to accelerate his transfer to the Central Prison. “ (Appendix No. 35)

– Jočić: that the meeting was organised because „the man is dangerous… not an ordinary man.“ (Appendix No. 35)

– Jočić, Milošević: that Jočić and Bulatović talked about Ulemek’s and his family’s safety. (Appendix No.36)

– Milošević: that Legija was taken to the premises of the Ministry, the headquarters of the Serbian police in Kneza Miloša 101, because that building is best protected. “(Appendix No. 37).

– Stojković: Minister of Justice joined them in providing excuses and justification by claiming that Ulemek was taken to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to determine his identity, which, of course, is not true, as his identity was established by the most reliable method, as the Commander of the Gendarmerie, Goran Radosaljević personally knew Ulemek.

Under the pressure of the public, upon a request of the Commissioner for Free Access to Information, Rodoljub Švabić, Minister Jočić submitted an official note about his meeting with Ulemek in the night of his surrender. (Appendix No. 38) There is reasonable doubt that the note (report) was composed at a later stage, since Jočić originally stated that „it is completely irrelevant who the principal defendant first talked to and who he was with. (Appendix No. 39). Then, in May 2005 when the public pressure was growing, Jočić refused to hand in the official note and said that the „unimportant thing“is a state secret.

The position contained in the Minister Jočić’s note that Ulemek „did not state any facts or details related to the proceedings against him and that authorised officials (i.e. him and Rade Bulatović) did not ask him questions. This statement was precisely calibrated in view of the doubt that they did not talk to Ulemek about the indictment but about false accusations against Čedomir Jovanović for the smuggling of 600 kilos of narcotics. (Appendix No. 40)

This suspicion is based on the fact that after the meeting between the Minister and Ulemek, and in the midst of the election campaign, DSS representatives gave statements that Ulemek’s testimony will „reveal the truth“, after which in his first testimony at the trial hearing, accusations of Čedomir Jovanović and self-incrimination by Ulemek related to the smuggling 600 kilos of heroin were heard, in spite of the fact that that was completely irrelevant for his defence before the court.

Acting on charges of the LDP against Jočić and Bulatović claiming that the official note was forged, prosecutor of the Second Prosecutors Office Zoran Jakovljević entrusted the General Inspectorate with the investigation, the body that is in charge of the control of the police and which is not under the direct control of Minister Jočić, since Jočić too was subject of investigation. In this procedure only suspect Ulemek was heard, and after that the investigation was discontinued under pressure. According to what prosecutor Jakovljević said, the discontinuation of the investigation was ordered „… the order came directly from the government, from the Ministry to be more precise, per chain of command, through the Republican Prosecutor and the District Prosecutor…and the whole event was preceded by intrigues behind the scene.“ “In my official report which I made under unprecedented pressure at the time… I noted that I received an order from my superiors to discontinue any activities related to this case,“ said Jakovljević. (Appendix No. 41)

The former General Inspector of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Božović, said in his statement to RTV B92 on 3rd September 2010, that he to was under pressure to discontinue the investigation related to the official note of Minister Jočić. (Appendix No. 42) “First other chiefs of cabinets called my chief of cabinet, and then Minister himself banned any activities related to this case … That meant that we had to stop any actions related to the case. I said that acting on this case will not stop, that we have the request of the competent prosecutor. Should the Prosecution waive its request, then we too will stop… Of course, I believe, that this was a matter of a big political decision and pressure to drop the case in order not to shed light on the background of the assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić.“

(19) Democratic Party of Serbia immediately took advantage of Milorad Ulemek’s surrender to discredit the Democratic Party and their presidential candidate. In his interview in the daily “Inter-nacional” Dejan Mihajlov said: “Lukovic’s (Ulemek’s) surrender is important because two persons suspected of assassinating the Prime Minister were killed and material evidence was destroyed. It is important to hear Legija’s testimony in order to find out the truth.” (Inter-nacional, 14th May 2004, quoted according to the collection of texts „Etika odgovornosti“ (Ethics of Responsibility), in the publication of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and O. Milivojčević’s „Kuća u Šilerovoj, glavni svedok“) (House in Silerova Street / the Key Witness).

Dragan Jočić, DSS official and Minister of Internal Affairs shares this confidence expressed in suspect Ulemek’s love of truth who said: “It is completely irrelevant where he was, who he talked to, everything that preceded, what is important is what is about to happen, i.e. what is important is his official role, a role of a man who can contribute to shedding light on the truth about the assassination of the Prime Minister. Let’s wait until 10th June and see what the principle defendant has to say“ (Appendix No. 39)

Suspect Koštunica said that the mere fact that suspect Ulemek will have the opportunity to testify before the court – “is a positive contribution to the court proceedings”, and that he, Koštunica, is afraid “that there are people who would be happier if Lukovic [Ulemek] did not testify in court”. (Appendix No. 43)

It remains unclear why is it expected, against common sense and experience, that any of the defendants will „reveal the truth“, and it is very characteristic that the first, forthcoming statement of the principle defendant is called „testimony“. This could be understood only if the contents of what suspect Ulemek will say in court were agreed when he turned himself in, and about whose „guilt“ will he testify.

(20) After his surrender, at the main hearing in the case, on 10th June 2004, suspect Ulemek said:“Your honour, regardless of how I plea today, I am convinced that my statement will influence, in some way, the presidential elections. I appeal to you as a reasonable man, to postpone my statement …. because I neither want to help nor hurt any of the presidential candidates at these elections“

(21) However, on 14th June 2004, even though the presidential camping was still underway, suspect Ulemek starts his defence with false self-incrimination for a serious criminal offence and talked about the smuggling of 600 kilos of heroin that he allegedly agreed with Čedomirom Jovanovićem and other people close to Zoran Đinđić, thus joining the presidential campaign and supporting the DSS candidate Dragan Maršićanin.

(21)Contrary to all rules of crime investigation and law enforcement, Dragan Jočić decides not to conduct investigation about the whereabouts of the defendant Milorad Ulemek over the last 14 months. It is only logical that such investigation would easily lead to accomplices and the mastermind of the assassination of (Appendix No. 39) (Appendix No. 44)

(22) Not only did Minister Dragan Jočić fail to investigate where was suspect Ulemek hiding during the 14 months, but he completely discontinued the search for the remaining fugitives who took part in the assassination of Prime Minister Đinđić. Such a decision is simply inconceivable and he never even attempted to explain or comment it. Mile Novkovic, one of the leaders of Sablja said to RTV B92 on 14th June 2010, that after the replacement of 400 people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2004, the organized search for the fugitives was discontinued. (Appendix No. 44)

(23) In the weekly Vreme no. 714 of 9th September 2004, journalist Miloš Vasić published a text entitled „Intercepting calls of Dejan Milenković Bagzi: Associates, Attorneys and Old Buddies“. The text includes a transcript of one of many intercepted telephone conversations between Dejan Milenkovic and his attorney Biljana Kajganić: Attorney Biljana Kajganić said to citizen Bagzi that she managed to reach an agreement for him to be cooperating witness; that she „ fixed this with old buddies”; that “Jočić agreed immediately”, and that Bulatović (Rade) confirmed this after consultations with the “top”. The condition was that Bagzi states before in the court that he organized the assassination of Momir Gavrilovic Gavra upon the order of Ljubiša Buha Čume, and that one Teča killed Gavra (the police was unable to prove anything in this regard for years). Then Bagzi said: “How can I say that when that is not the truth?”, and attorney Biljana Kajganić replied: “Who cares if that is the truth or not? Hey, these tow people are the most powerful men in the country, you fool!” (Appendix No. 45).

In the same article Miloš Vasić says:: „The whole conversation, carried on in the same tone, was recorded, transcribed and registered by UBPOK. Boro Banjac, the then head of UBPOK sent the transcript of this conversation to Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, Minister of internal affairs Dragan Jočić, Minister of Justice Zoran Stojković, Head of the Public Security Service General Miroslav Milošević etc. The next day Minister Jočić called Banjac to have him dismissed and warned him that the conversation must be kept as a secret, or else… ”

Some kept silent about the existence of this transcript; others deny its existence, while Minister Sojković pressed charges against journalist Vasić for defamation. Acting on charges for defamation, prosecutor of the Third Municipal Prosecutors Office, Gordana Čolić tried to learn about the contents of the transcript but her superiors told her that she can not do that, in spite of the fact that, by nature of her work, this was necessary, because otherwise it would be impossible to determine that Vasić’s allegations were false (Appendix No. 46)

Even at the trial of the assassins of Zoran Đinđić, it was impossible to establish the contents of this transcript, because the Presiding Judge, Nata Mesarević would not allow the complainant to see the transcript.

The mystery around the existence and the contents of this transcript was finally resolved when Bora Banjac, the then head of UBPOK, who said to RTB B92, on 16th June 2010 that the contents of the transcript that journalist Miloš Vasić wrote about is true. (Appendix No.47)

(24) On 20th April, during the main hearing in the trial for the assassination of the Prime Minister, a group of six young men, who were, as it turned out, members of the Gendarmerie, dressed in T-shirts with the insignia of the Special Operations Unit (wolf with an open jaw and a red beret on his head) appeared in the courtroom in support of the assassinators. The public was shocked and some asked that this incident be sanctioned.

Dragan Jočić, DSS official and Minister of Internal Affairs justified this incident in the following manner: „As for the shirts, they just wore them to express their attitude towards the Unit and they way it worked, after all it is a war Unit considered as unbreakable and the attitude of the young men, of which, some, to my knowledge, were not even members of JSO, shows their affiliation and enthusiasm, and is by no means a new conspiracy“ („Berets still function as a wolf pack“ Blic online, 24th April 2004) (Appendix No. 48)

(25) Mutual trust between the DSS and suspect Ulemek was evident once again, when Minister Jočić and suspect Ulemek gave the same explanation about his sudden surrender after 14 months of hiding.

At the trial hearing in the case K.p. No. 5/03, when asked by the complainants attorney why didn’t he turn himself in immediately if he was convinced that that was a „mistake“, suspect Ulemek said: „Well, because of a very simple reason. When you are indicted immediately, an hour or two after the assassination, you know, it is not as if they claim that you broke into a kiosk and you go to the police and explain. It is obvious that this was a game… and now, from this perspective, I see that I was absolutely right not to turn myself in that first day, because if I did I wouldn’t be standing here.“

“…I would not want…… anyone to think that I am taking any particular political direction, but I realized that after the change of government which, I am sure, made this whole construction, related to this story, the climate somehow changed… That was my motive to turn myself in.“ (Appendix No. 49)

In his statement given for the program Insajder on TV B92, the former head of UBOPK- Boro Banjac, described how Minister Jočić and chief of Public Security Service „were excited and praised themselves and the new government because Legija turned himself in to them … Owing to us, he trusts this government and that is why he turned himself in.“ (Appendix No. 50)

All this speaks ample of the attitude of suspect Koštunica, his closest associates and his party vis a vissuspect Ulemek and the Special Operations Unit. Apart from all expressions of mutual respect („Mr. Legija“, „ the elite unit“ „Legija will reveal the truth“ „ understandable enthusiasm of young people towards JSO“ , „Legija’s threats directed to the government are threats by the people, armed insurrection is a „victory of patriotism“, promises given to the Unit „that there will be no Hague if they turn to Koštunica“ , expressions of mutual „trust“ and „enthusiasm“ at the time of Ulemek’s surrender etc.), one can see that both sides are carrying out a number o coordinated actions and steps directed towards unconstitutional overthrow of Zoran Đinđić’s government.

In that regard, a characteristic example is the above described support rendered by the Ulemek-Spasojević tandem to the campaign of Koštunica and DSS during two consecutive election campaigns. Firstly, when, during September 2002, they were dictating to Ljiljan Buha letters for the public with allegations that Đinđić had ties with mafia, and then suspect Koštunica and DSS quoted them in their campaign as irrefutable facts, and then the second time, after the unlawful and secret meeting with Dragan Jočić and Rade Bulatović – suspect Ulemek starts his defence in the case by falsely incriminating himself that, together with Čedomir Jovanović, he smuggled 600 kilos of heroin. Suspect Koštunica and DSS use this in the presidential campaign of their candidate Maršićanin.

A characteristic example is also the protection given to Rade Marković, accomplice to JSO in criminal offences by the members of the Unit, which enabled the destruction of documentation and abuse of Security services.

When Krsmanović, Juričić and Pović threw a bomb on the headquarters of DSS-and then said that Zoran Đinđić ordered the attack, suspect Koštunica uses this as an evidence of the „coexistence of the government and the mafia“.

Jočić and Bulatović secretly met with the fugitive Ulemek, and were unable to explain the purpose of this meeting, instead of turning him to the judicial authorities. After this meeting, suspect Ulemek presents his allegations about heroin smuggling, and in turn Koštunica’s DSS (Zoran Stojković, Dragan Jočić, Gradimir Nalić, Dejan Mihajlov, Miroslav Milošević) started a long and systematic obstruction of the trial, by attacking the Presiding judge, the Special prosecutor and his deputies. It is reasonable to doubt that all these uniform and harmonized steps of the DSS officials are coordinated by suspect Koštunica, as the President of the party and as Prime Minister.

Apart from all this, one should not forget that suspect Koštunica, within the irreconcilable conflict with Zoran Đinđić and his government, never shrank from unlawful acts, especially from the abuse of the security services, like for example in the case of the planned break-in the Bureau of the Government of the Republic of Serbia. (Appendix No. 52) (Appendix No. 53) (Appendix No. 54)

Finally, suspects Ulemek and Zvezdan Jovanovic, according to their own words, „saved Serbia“by killing Zoran Đinđić because they created conditions for „true patriots“to come to power.

All these events cannot be explained as sheer coincidence, they represent powerful reasonable doubt that must be investigated.


Suspect Aco Tomić

In a letter of the Military Security Agency of the Ministry of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro, Highly Classified, No. 1-31, dated 22nd June 2003, forwarded to the Administration for Fighting Organized Crime (UBPOK), the Military Security Agency informed about its knowledge about the contacts between General Aco Tomić and Borislav Mikelić, Milorad Ulemek and Dušan Spasojević.

According to the information, „in November 2010, when Generals Tomić and Pavković were about to go for an official visit to Moscow, (12th November), during the insurrection of the Red Berets, Mikelić and Legija came to General Tomić… Legija asked if he would see his friend who wants to see the General who arrested Perišić“. Soon after Dušan Spasojević came, who was probably waiting in the car. Rade Bulatović was present at this meeting. Legija had information that there will be a conflict between JSO and „Cobras“ and since he believed that they were subordinated to the Security Agency of the General Staff, he asked for Tomić’s opinion about this. Tomić gave him guarantees that the Army will not interfere.“ (Appendix No. 8)

Security Agency of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army sent a similar letter on 9th April 2003, Highly classified no.4307-1, to the Advisor of the Ministry for policy and security and intelligence affairs.

This corresponds to the statement of suspect Ulemek who, as the principal defendant, at the trial hearing on 14th June 2004 in the said case K.p.5/03 said that he was concerned that there was a possibility for the Army to „interfere“.

According to journalist Oliver Stanojević, in an article published in Vreme No. 699, dated 27th May 2004, and entitled ‘The Life and Times of Mr. Tomić’, Major-Gen. Dr. Todor Petković, deputy commander of the Security Department of the Army of Yugoslavia of suspect in this complaint Aco Tomić, submitted a request for early retirement a couple of days after the JSO’s insurrection, because, as he said, he “did not want to be in the service of Ljilja Nedeljković and other sundry advisors”, and that “with Tomić [at its head] it was impossible for the Security Department to be a professional segment of the Army. In an internal complaint against Aco Tomić submitted to General Pavković, he said he had witnessed Tomić issue guarantees that the army would not react to the JSO deploying in the streets and that he had “said, while laughing, … You guys just do your job, don’t worry about the army”. (Appendix No. 51)

Finally, this corresponds with the knowledge and assessments of the then RDB head, Goran Petrović, and Minister of the Interior Dušan Mihajlović, heard as witnesses in case

Witness Goran Petrović (trial hearing, 18th May 2005), spoke about the existence of operational data in connection with the insurrection, some of them dealing with intercepted conversations indicating that “the Army of Yugoslavia, i.e., its security services, is implicated in the entire story according to the data we obtained, we concluded that the Unit enjoyed the support of the Army of Yugoslavia, or individuals or certain segments of the security services.”

In testimony at a trial hearing in case No. 5/03, witness Vladimir Popović said about the person who had presented the JSO’s demand at a news conference during the insurrection: “If you remember that famous Major Batić, with his fabricated name, who held the news conference in Kula. It was a person brought in from the Army two weeks before the insurrection. It was a man brought in from the military intelligence service 15 days before the insurrection, and attached to the Unit without the knowledge of Goran Petrović, without the knowledge of the minister of police, without the knowledge of the prime minister, because they [JSO] were a state within a state. And it is not by accident that that person came up with the rank of major and the name Batić and held a news conference and explained and read out the political demands. Those political demands had not been written in Kula…“

Witness Dušan Mihajlović said: “I realised that someone had prepared an insurrection behind our backs” (record of the trial hearing of 15th March 2005) “… we realised that we could not count on the support of the Army, which was the only force capable of confronting the JSO, and from their public statements we also saw that many others are offering clear political support to the Unit’s insurrection”.

By his promises given to suspect Ulemek and to Dušan Spasojević, the leaders of the then ongoing armed insurrection, that the Army would not intervene to stop the insurrection, suspect Aco Tomić indubitably incited the leaders of the insurrection by strengthening their criminal resolve and their decision to persevere in their insurrection.

According to testimony in case No., the antagonism between Đinđić’s Government and the Army and its security services has a history going right back to the first days following the 5th October 2000 events.

Once a large number of generals were indicted for war crimes by the ICTY, the main activity of the Department headed by suspect in this complaint Aco Tomić became the defence of those indictees. By the very nature of things, the most obvious ICTY candidates were among Army and police personnel. For this reason, from Day One the Army treated Đinđić as a “traitor” and sought protection in the lap of their commander-in-chief, suspect in this complaint Vojislav Koštunica.

“We had problems with the military security service practically from Day One, from 5th October, when there was a refusal to have any sort of co-operation between the new democratic government in Serbia and what had been retained at the level of the Federal state. We were aware that the Army was openly protecting ICTY indictees … we knew the names of the people responsible for coordination in the Serbian RDB and the military security service in connection with the concealing of Ratko Mladić… They also concealed Šljivančanin… Vinko Pandurević was hidden away in the barracks in Lađevci.”

“The Republican Government had no contacts or proper communication, not only with the military security service, but with the very leadership of the Army, as that leadership had from the beginning assumed a hostile stance and refused with indignation any form of co-operation and communication with the Serbian republican authorities. I shall remind you here that the number-one man in the military security service, General Đaković, was replaced on the very day Slobodan Milošević was extradited to the ICTY. Đaković was sacked, as it was defined at the time, owing to a failure, or inability, of the Army to prevent the extradition. He was then replaced by General Tomić, appointed to the post although he did not meet statutory requirements …“ (testimony of witness Čedomir Jovanović in case No., trial hearing on 11th April 2005).

I move

that in the preliminary proceedings (after information is obtained from the police about the addresses of suspects and witnesses; Article 235, paragraph 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code) the following be questioned:

Suspects: Milorad Ulemek, Dušan Maričić, Zvezdan Jovanović, Veselin Lečić, Mića Petraković, Dragoslav Krsmanović, Dragoš Radić, Vojislav Koštunica and Aco Tomić, as well as witnesses: Vladimir Popović, Dejan Mihajlov, Zoran Mijatović, Saša Pejaković, Goran Petrović, Milorad Bracanović, Čedomir Jovanović, Dušan Mihajlović, Vladimir Potić, Ljubiša Buha, Vladimir Nikolić, Zoran Janjušević, Rodoljub Milović, Rade Bulatović, Nebojša Pavković, Gradimir Nalić, Radomir Marković, Zoran Šami, Ilija Matić, Ljiljana Buha, Miroljub Labus, Zoran Stojković, Dragan Jočić, Miroslav Milošević, Maja Kovačević, Marko Kljajević, Goran “Guri” Radosavljević, Zoran Jakovljević, Vladimir Božović, Biljana Kajganić, Miloš Vasić, Boro Banjac, Gordana Čolić, Nata Mesarević, Borislav Mikelić, Oliver Stanojević, Todor Petković, and that the testimony be read out of Zoran Vukojević, given on 13th April 2004 at a trial hearing in case No.

I move

that the following documents, given here as appendices, also be read out in the preliminary proceedings:

(1) Goran Petrović, head of the State Security Service: “JSO personnel should continue their regular activities”, Tanjug, 10th November 2001.;

(2) The Victory of Patriotism”, NIN No. 2674, 28th March 2002;

(3) Koštunica: “I Have no Influence on the JSO”, Tanjug, 15th November 2001;

(4) Remembering the JSO Strike: ‘Red Berets and the “Zemun Clan’,B92 Info, Vesti, 22nd March 2003;

(5) The Resignation of Radomir Marković, 25th January 2001;

(6) an ‘information’ of the Belgrade RDB Centre dated 15th March 2001;

(7) Red Berets Control Policy”, Glas javnosti, 11th November 2001;

(8) Information about the contacts between general Aco Tomić and Borislav Mikelić, Milorad Luković and Dušan Spasojević, Military Security Service Department, 22nd June 2003;

(9) Who Released Spasojević from Prison?”, Vreme No. 648, 5th June 2003;

(10) “’Legija’, ‘Duća’ and the Guys from Kula”, Vreme No. 637, 20th March 2003;

(11) JSO Personnel Bloc Highway by the Sava Centre”, B92, 12th November 2001;

(12) Zoran Šami on the Arrests of the Banović Brothers: a Humiliation for One Side and for the Other”, Večernje novosti, 13th November 2001;

(13)The Fogs and Outlooks of Mount Povlen” p. 221, Nea doo, 2005;

(14) pp. 41, 130, 929, 928 and 902 of the verdict of the District Court in Belgrade, Special Department for Organised Crime No. dated 18th January 2008;

(15)Bombs Failed to Break Up the DOS”, Večernje novosti, 10th October 2005;

(16) The DSS’s Question: Cooperating Witness or Repentant?”, Politika, 1st February 2003;

(17) Buha: ‘Camarilla’ Planned to Murder Koštunica and Šešelj”, Nacional, 30th September 2002;

(18) Transcript of a Labus-Koštunica TV Duel, B92 Interview, 9th October 2002;

(19) An Open Letter of the Former Commander of the ‘Red Berets’: It’s a Miserable Country where ‘Čume’ Reveals Secrets”,Blic, 28th January 2003;

(20) Jočić: ‘Legija’s Analysis of the Government’s Work”,Blic, 29th January 2003;

(21) Time to Rally”, Večernje novosti, 17th March 2003;

(22) Our Guest: Vojislav Koštunica, the President of the DSS”, TV B92 interview, 27th March 2003;

(23) Abolition of the Special Court Expected”, Glas javnosti, 30th March 2004;

(24) Jočić: Police Must Re-examine Đinđić’s Assassination”,B92, Beta, 10 April 2004.;

(25)For Zoran – a Bullet, for Voja – Prison”, Večernje novosti, 20th April 2004;

(26) DSS Accuses Živković and Tadić”, B92, Beta, 17th May 2004;

(27) Mihajlov: I Don’t Remember, I don’t Know …”, B92, Beta, 15th March 2005;

(28)Pressure on the Court”, Danas, 14th January 2004;

(29) Prijić Still Has no Successor”, Blic, 28th February 2005;

(30) Political Background of the Assassination”, TVB92 Insajder, 13th March 2008;

(31) How ‘Legija’ Surrendered”, Večernje novosti, 19th May 2005;

(32) Who was Alone with Ulemek”, B92 Info News, 18th May 2005;

(33) Jočić: We Did Not Negotiate with ‘Legija’”, B92 Info News, 3rd May 2004;

(34) I Was Not Intimate with ‘Legija’”, Blic, 18th June 2005;

(35) A Conversation with a Very Dangerous Man”, B92 Info News 15th June 2005;

(36) Asked Jočić and Bulatović to Guarantee Security”, Danas, 21-22nd May 2005;

(37) Official memo”, TV B92, 31st March 2006;

(38) MUP Hands Over Memo to Insajder”, B92 Info News, 29th March 2006.;

(39) Jočić: We Should Wait”, B92 Info News, 31st May 2004;

(40) Official Memo on the Surrender of Milorad ‘Legija’ Luković”, Minister Dragan Jočić;

(41) Authorities Halt Investigation against ‘Legija’?”, B92 Info News, 2nd September 2010;

(42) Božović Also Says There Were Pressures”, B92 Info News, 3rd September 2010;

(43) Prime Minister: Mister Legija Surrendered Voluntarily”, Kurir, 5th May 2004;

(44) “’Insajder’ on the Search for the Zemun [Gang]”, B92 Info News, 14th June 2010;

(45) Assistants, Attorneys and Other Pals”, Vreme No. 714, 9th September 2004;

(46) Pressure on Prosecutors”, TV B92 Insajder, 13th December 2006;

(47) (Banjac): Dismissed Because He was Searching for [members of] the Zemun [Gang]”, B92, 16th June 2010;

(48) “’Red Berets’ Continue to Function as a Wolf-Pack”, Blic, 24th April 2004;

(49) Defendant Milorad Ulemek, trial hearing, 6th September 2004, No. 5/03”;

(50) From the Working Version of the Show ‘Insajder’, Guest: Boro Banjac”, TV B92, 26th October 2010;

(51) The Life and Times of Mr. Tomić”, Vreme No. 699, 27th May 2004;

(52) I was Ordered to Mount an Assault with Special Forces on the Government of Serbia”, Nedeljni Telegraf, 26th June 2002;

(53) Nalić and Tomić Demanded an Assault on the Information Bureau”,B92 Info News, 27th June 2002;

(54) Commission of Inquiry Continues Work”, B92 Info News, 23rd July 2002.

I move

for the Special Prosecutor, following implementation of the preliminary proceedings, to file a request for an investigation to be conducted by an investigating judge of the District Court in Belgrade, Special Department for Organised Crime, against the persons suspected of the aforementioned criminal offences.

11th November 2010


Represented by:
Srđa Popović, attorney at law

Pešč, 17.11.2010.

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Srđa Popović (1937-2013), jugoslovenski advokat ljudskih prava. Branio mladog Zorana Đinđića, Brigitte Mohnhaupt (Baader-Meinhof), Vojislava Šešelja, Dušana Makavejeva, Milorada Vučelića, Mihajla Markovića, Miću Popovića, Predraga Čudića, Nebojšu Popova, Vladimira Mijanovića (Vlada Revolucija), Milana Nikolića, Mihajla Mihailova, Dobroslava Paragu, Milana Milišića, Vladimira Šeksa, Andriju Artukovića, Beogradsku šestoricu, profesore izbačene sa Filozofskog fakulteta... Pokretač peticija za ukidanje člana 133 (delikt govora), ukidanje smrtne kazne, uvođenje višestranačja u SFRJ... 1990. pokrenuo prvi privatni medij u Jugoslaviji, nedeljnik Vreme. Posle dolaska Miloševića na vlast iselio se u SAD, vratio se 2001. Poslednji veliki sudski proces: atentat na Zorana Đinđića. Govorio u 60 emisija Peščanika. Knjige: Kosovski čvor 1990, Put u varvarstvo 2000, Tačka razlaza 2002, Poslednja instanca I, II, III 2003, Nezavršeni proces 2007, One gorke suze posle 2010.

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